## \*\*\*1AC

### 1AC – Weapons of Mass Production

#### Contention One --- Weapons of Mass Production

#### ---In the summer of 2005, Congress erupted in outrage at the possibility of Chinese investment in American oil and natural gas. Citing the apocalyptic threat of Sino “weapons of mass production,” Congress passed the Exon-Florio amendment empowering the Council on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to severely restrict foreign energy investors.

Carroll, Attorney for Rogers Law Offices, 2009

James, Emory International Law Review, COMMENT: BACK TO THE FUTURE: REDEFINING THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACT'S CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167

The Unocal Incident: Protectionism Run Amok The response to the attempt of CNOOC to purchase Unocal, an American oil company, exemplified the tighter CFIUS approach. 95 CNOOC, a Chinese state-owned oil company, regularly purchased foreign oil companies to create joint-ventures between itself and the foreign companies. 96 The Chinese government recognized that there would be a CFIUS review under the Byrd Amendment, since CNOOC was state-owned, but felt that ultimately there was no security risk and that the transaction would pass the CFIUS review. 97 However, on June 24, 2005, 41 members of Congress from both parties wrote to President Bush urging a thorough CFIUS review of the sale. 98 The letter justified the review by raising questions about "whether CNOOC was using Chinese government funds to make the purchase and whether China [\*181] would be acquiring sensitive technology." 99 Congress followed up this letter with the introduction of a resolution in the House on June 29, 2005, that recognized oil and natural gas as strategic national assets and argued that the purchase of Unocal would allow for the oil reserves to be preferentially sent to China - instead of purchasing them on the open market - thus opening up the possibility of China utilizing the "oil weapon" against the United States. 100 China hawks 101 echoed these arguments, claiming that the deal would give China more leverage over the international oil market and that regardless of the facts of the transaction, the symbolic nature of giving into China's resource goals should be prevented at all costs. 102 Unsurprisingly, hawkish arguments toward China played a large role in congressional opposition to the deal. 103 The Bush administration kept relatively quiet during the Unocal controversy, 104 and eventually CNOOC withdrew their bid in the face of the negative publicity. 105 The most remarkable aspect of this episode was the congressional majority's attempt to implicitly redefine national security. The definition of national security was no longer limited to technologies that were at least arguably related to the national defense industrial complex. Congressional opponents of the Unocal sale used public debate surrounding the deal to include energy assets in an expanded interpretation of national security and continued the long-running congressional struggle to use Exon-Florio and the CFIUS review process as a protectionist tool to prevent foreign investment in U.S. industry. 106 Previous CFIUS reviews focused on technological acquisitions that could allow foreign countries unique access to U.S. military capabilities, 107 in contrast to energy companies, which had no [\*182] direct connection to the military. If national security can also mean "important to the United States economy," as energy assets no doubt are, then the definition of national security differs in no meaningful sense from the original "essential commerce" bill that Reagan threatened to veto in order to strip the economic security provisions.

#### ---Fear of foreign control over oil and natural gas subverts the Exon-Florio process, resulting in racially politicized threat construction.

Carroll, Attorney for Rogers Law Offices, 2009

James, Emory International Law Review, COMMENT: BACK TO THE FUTURE: REDEFINING THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACT'S CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167

Fear of foreign control has always politicized the Exon-Florio process. The tide of popular perception that the Japanese were purchasing large portions of the American economy largely drove the passage of the original Exon-Florio bill in 1988. Similarly, economic competition from a rising China and acquisitions from oil-rich Middle Eastern states have driven Exon-Florio investigations in the 2000s. In the 1980s, the continual investigations of Japanese acquisitions hindered U.S. foreign policy goals of maintaining good relations with a crucial ally in the Cold War and major trading partner. In the twenty-first century, maintaining good relations with China and cultivating ties to moderate Arab states are important elements of U.S. foreign policy. Once again, protectionist forces are using Exon-Florio as a political tool and outlet of public unrest, regardless of diplomatic concerns. The political pressures inherent in the Exon-Florio investigations prevent the CFIUS from accurately balancing security concerns because the definition of national security changes with the popular perception of threats. Unease about high oil prices torpedoed a relatively innocuous Chinese acquisition of a U.S. oil company. Just as in the 1980s and 90s, with the scare over Japanese acquisitions, many national security experts agree that there is no true threat in many of the recent proposed acquisitions. Nevertheless, the vague interpretation of national security allows politicians to grandstand and manipulate the CFIUS process by appealing to public fears of high oil prices or Muslims. Instead of a careful consideration of all of the different national security factors driving the CFIUS process, Exon-Florio investigations are driven by the political winds in Congress.

#### ---Specifically, the policy of energy security review places Chinese oil investment as part of a larger homogenous strategy for global domination. Corporate action that would otherwise be widely considered business as usual is securitized & presented as evidence of China’s coordinated global assault on the American way of life.

Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, 2009

Chengxin, What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the ‘rise of China’ in global production networks, Journal of Contemporary China, 18(58), January, 7–25

While many foreign businesses are moving their operations to China, many Chinese businesses, following a ‘going global’ strategy, seem to have begun rapid expansion abroad. A recent example is that in 2005 China’s oil company CNOOC launched a bid to buy the California-based oil company Unocal. American economist and commentator Paul Krugman compared it with the Japanese challenge in the 1990s, but his conclusions were notably different. He wrote: Fifteen years ago, when Japanese companies were busily buying up chunks of corporate America, I was one of those urging Americans not to panic . . . But the Chinese challenge—highlighted by the bids for Maytag and Unocal—looks a lot more serious than the Japanese challenge ever did.5 Republican congressman Dana Rohrabacher was less circumspect, labeling the Unocal bid as ‘part of [China’s] long-term strategy for domination’. He insisted that the greatest threat to America’s freedom and prosperity ‘is not radical Islam [but] a China that is emerging on the scene that is belligerent to everything we stand for as a people’.6 Importantly, these views were echoed strongly among the American public: an opinion poll at the time found that 73% of Americans opposed the CNOOC– Unocal deal, with half of the respondents going as far as perceiving the Chinese as an adversary.7 According to Peter Navarro, the author of The Coming China Wars, China’s ‘unfair, mercantilist trading practices’ such as the China price, the ‘going global’ strategy, and its voracious appetite for energy and resources constitute what he calls ‘weapons of mass production’. Testifying before the Congress-mandated US–China Economic and Security Review Commission in early 2007, the University of California business professor charged that these ‘weapons of mass production’ have been allowing China to ‘conquer one new export market after another’.8 In this context, many security analysts and practitioners agree that the economic challenge will have far-reaching military and foreign policy implications. The Pentagon argues that the performance of China’s economy is a main driving force behind its domestic defense expenditures, foreign acquisitions, and indigenous defense industrial developments.9 Indeed, the emergence of Chinese businesses has been seen as a harbinger of the beginning of a historic power transition from the US to China. Like previous power transitions in the international system, it is argued that the rise of China does not bode well for international peace and stability.10 For Navarro, coordinated centrally by the Chinese government, the mercantilist practices of Chinese businesses do not just help China gain increasing economic and financial advantage over US businesses, but also contribute to China’s rapid military modernization and lay the groundwork for the ‘coming China wars’.11 At this juncture, what is remarkable about these analyses of Chinese businesses and business practices is not so much their attention to the aspect of economic and military threat. Rather, for the purpose of this essay, it is their grounding of Chinese businesses in an unproblematic, fixed, and more or less coherent actor called China, whereby Chinese businesses acquire their Chineseness. For example, the China price is believed to be produced ‘in the unique stew of China’s evolving business culture’,12 and the conquest of the global market by Chinese products is often traced back to the Chinese government. In the words of Hornig and Wagner, the ‘desk drawers of party strategists are filled with detailed plans promoting national industries from automaking to biotechnology’.13 Indeed, frequently the assumption of the Chineseness about Chinese businesses goes so far as to conjure up a scenario of a whole country engaged in concerted efforts of building national greatness through sustained economic development and aggressive business strategies. To illustrate this point, it helps to refer to a ‘bill’ metaphor used by some commentators, with the bill symbolizing the costs incurred by the US as a result of the influx of ‘Chinese’ cheap imports. On the bill, as the metaphor goes, the costs for America, apart from the big trade deficits with China, also include ‘domestic layoffs, the relocation of entire industries, cutbacks for research and development and the downfall of the oncealmighty dollar’. And the ‘payee’? ‘A population of billions’.14 In other words, what is behind Chinese businesses is nothing short of the whole Chinese nation.

#### ---Visualizing Chinese businesses as a coherent whole enables racial violence. The characterization of Chinese oil investment as a national security threat provides an economic scapegoat provoking a murderous public backlash to preserve American national identity.

Pan 2007

Chengxin, School of International and Political Studies, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, What Is Chinese About Chinese Business? Implications for U.S. Responses to China’s Rise, Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers

Secondly and more importantly, this construction of Otherness is prescriptive in practical and policy terms. While explaining where faults and problems lie, the perceptions of Chinese business as a closed national category are often able, even if they are not intended, to mobilise public support and influence policy-making on China. Only when Chinese businesses and their practices are cast in national terms, can their alleged ‘victims’ suitably take on similar national significance in terms of, for example, American national interest, national security, national competitiveness, or national identity. And when the national interest, security and national identity are thought to be at stake, any measures that are allegedly able to safeguard these interests would be more easily legitimatised and implemented. For example, without doubt, it is American perceptions of a Chinese takeover that helped to mobilise politicians and the public to foil Haier’s attempt to buy Maytag and CNOOC’s high-profile bids to buy Unocal in 2005. With U.S. national security believed to be at stake, the fact that ‘Unocal’s oil and gas reserves were mostly located in Asia to begin with, and played a negligible role in satisfying US energy demand, made little difference to those who voted against CNOOC’ (Klare 2006:183). More importantly, by visualising Chinese business as something of a coherent whole, unified around a single centre, this construction not only obscures the changing dynamics of Chinese business in the complex global economic networks, but also informs a zero-sum approach to China and justifies otherwise unjustifiable actions against this perceived national security threat. For example, Souchou Yao notes that the prevalent images of ‘Chinese economic success’ in Southeast Asia, with the unquestioned Chineseness at their core, were in many ways complicit in the murderous race riots in Malaysia during May 1969 and the violent anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia in the wake of Suharto’s downfall (Yao 2002:4). In times of economic and political volatility, the equation of specific Chinese businesses with such totalising categories as race and class conveniently but often violently shifted the target of public outrage away from the relevant regime and onto ethnic Chinese populations as a whole. Though with less disastrous consequences, **similar episodes were replayed** in Spain in September 2004, when local footwear manufacturers, chanting ‘Chinese out,’ burned two Chinese-owned warehouses in revenge for their business losses from ‘unfair Chinese competition.’

#### ---This nationalist frame locks in global inequality, presenting an impossible choice to the impoverished residence; either silently accept worsening economic conditions or embrace destructive nationalism based on racial superiority.

Hart-Landsberg & Burkett 2006

Martin, Professor of Economics and Director of the Political Economy Program at Lewis and Clark College, Paul, professor of economics at Indiana State University, China and the Dynamics of Transnational Accumulation: Causes and Consequences of Global Restructuring, Historical Materialism, volume 14:3 (3–43)

Our analysis of contemporary dynamics also highlights the fact that this transnational capitalist restructuring, within which China plays such a critical role, is generating tensions and imbalances. For example, East-Asian growth is increasingly dependent on ever-greater US trade deﬁcits. This trend cannot continue forever. In saying this, we do not mean to predict that capitalism has reached some ﬁnal crisis. Rather, our point is that these imbalances will have to be corrected, and insofar as the logic of capitalist competition goes unchallenged, governments can be expected to manage the resulting economic instabilities with policies that will only further worsen living and working conditions. In fact, they are likely to generate explanations for the necessity of such policies that will deliberately foment racism and a destructive nationalism. Whether workers can develop a response to this situation remains to be seen. Clearly, the dynamic nature of the system and the fact that wealth is being created tends to mask the destructive nature of the system. So does the mainstream perspective on the Chinese experience. We need to challenge that perspective and demystify the transnational capitalist processes that are reshaping different countries’ economies, in order to reveal the capitalist roots of the growing social problems faced by workers around the world and the structural imbalances that threaten yet further immiseration. Finally, we need to translate this understanding into a programme of action that can assist the birth of national, regional, and global movements for change that can enable working people to reclaim control over their lives.

#### ---The narrative of unified Chinese business interests precludes and assimilates progressive local activism folding it into a larger interlocking process of global economic scapegoating*.*

Hart-Landsberg & Burkett 2006

Martin, Professor of Economics and Director of the Political Economy Program at Lewis and Clark College, Paul, professor of economics at Indiana State University, China and the Dynamics of Transnational Accumulation: Causes and Consequences of Global Restructuring, Historical Materialism, volume 14:3 (3–43)

Although China’s National Bureau of Statistics has concluded, based on survey research, that only 5 per cent of the country’s population can currently be considered middle-class, the government is conﬁdent that its economic policies will raise this to 45 per cent by 2020. However, such a prediction ﬂies in the face of the lived experiences of Chinese working people. As a Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions report explains, ‘globalisation’ has left Chinese workers: isolated in a global equation in which job insecurity and poverty award employers with the upper hand in what has become known as the race to the bottom. Workers in developed countries are told that they must accept lower wages and ﬂexible working conditions to stop their bosses moving production abroad. Meanwhile, workers in SOEs in China are told they must accept a decline in conditions and welfare or be replaced by migrant workers from the countryside. And migrant workers, especially in the coastal Special Economic Zones, are told that they must accept wage arrears and lax health and safety or the boss will move to a more investor-friendly environment further inland.

#### ---The dominant frame of Chinese oil and natural gas investment as an act of national aggression makes American security policy a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Pan 2007

Chengxin, School of International and Political Studies, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, What Is Chinese About Chinese Business? Implications for U.S. Responses to China’s Rise, Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers

From the global production network perspective, not only does the assumption of a zero-sum game between China and the United States become problematic, but the notion of the so-called ‘Chinese business practices’ becomes problematic, as what is often termed as ‘Chinese business practices’ may be seen as a product of the interactions between Chinese and transnational companies, including U.S. companies. For instance, the Unocal bids by CNOOC, a state-owned company in China, has been seen as a proof of China’s sinister business strategy to undermine U.S. national security. Yet, what is less well-known is that Goldman Sachs, whose CEO Henry Paulson is currently U.S. Treasury Secretary, was involved in financing the aborted CNOOC-Unocal deal (Hawkins 2006). In this sense, Chinese companies’ acquisitions of natural resources in various parts of the world, while drawing much alarm and criticism in the U.S. and elsewhere, are nothing uniquely Chinese. As Michael Klare explains, the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and other Western oil-importing countries have long competed among themselves for drilling rights in overseas producing areas…. China may be a newcomer to this contest, but is not behaving noticeably differently from the other oil-seekers. Indeed, the “National Energy Policy” announced by President George W. Bush on May 17, 2001, calls for US officials to conduct the same sort of diplomatic quest in pursuit of foreign energy as that now being undertaken by Chinese officials (Klare 2006:182). Understood this way, threatening to retaliate against ‘China’ is not only unlikely to eliminate those ‘Chinese’ business practices, but it could in fact provide further impetus to them. It is in this sense that I consider the policies based on a unitary Chinese economic Other counterproductive and potentially dangerous. Again take the American nationalistic responses to CNOOC’s Unocal for example. By effectively declaring to the Chinese that North America is off limits, American policy-makers sent ‘precisely the wrong message to China’s modernizing managerial class and encourage highly damaging … tendencies in China, including nationalism, mercantilism and distrust of the international markets’ Harding et al 2006:64). Similarly, Hadar notes that ‘by taking steps to derail the Unocal-CNOOC deal, Washington is helping set in motion what could be only described as a self-fulfilling prophecy’ (2005). Since no amount of U.S. legislation would be able to reduce the global production demand for energy in China, China would seem to ‘have no choice in light of the US policies but to form special economic or foreign policy relationships’ with the so-called ‘rogue states’ (Hadar 2005). Of course, this in turn could confirm the suspicion of China many Americans have long held, thereby giving rise to a vicious cycle of mutual suspicion and hostility. Starting out with the image of a homogeneous Chinese Other and consistently acting upon it, hawkish policy-makers in Washington could well succeed in bringing out a more unified rival in China down the road.

#### ---These systems of nationalist paranoia risk catastrophic war.

Pan 2004

Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 43-44

Like the liberal construction of Other touched on above, this largely realist framing of Other carries with it some profound implications in practice. That is, when the Other is depicted as a fixed geopolitical threat, waging a war (or at least preparing for war) to destroy it often becomes the only rational option to fulfilling the universal self. In this regard, Robert Young notes that “war constitutes the [Western] philosophical concept of being itself. For being is always defined as the appropriation of either difference into identity, or of identities into a greater order…. War, then, is another form of the appropriation of the other….”33 In this context, not surprisingly, war has figured prominently in U.S. foreign relations: War is always violent, bloody, and destructive. But American wars are fought for great and good ends, and they result in good for America. The Revolution created freedom, independence, and democracy. The Civil War resulted in the expansion of freedom, the destruction of slavery, the growth of industrial might and wealth, and the formation of a unified, powerful nation.34 Insofar as both liberal and realist framings of Other are derived from the same particular American self-construction, their different approaches to understanding global politics in general and China in particular are basically mutually complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. Recently, this relationship of mutual complement is particularly striking in the emergence of a ‘two worlds’ theory, and its various incarnations such as the new imperialism, liberal imperialism, the New Wilsonianism, and neo-conservatism.35 As neoconservative commentators William Kristol and Robert Kagan put it, both ‘moral clarity’ and ‘military strength’ are essential if Americans are to continue to be proud of their leading role in world affairs.36

#### Thus the plan --- The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce foreign investment restrictions on oil and gas production in the United States.

#### Contention Two --- Global Production Networks

#### ---Voting affirmative embraces a view of oil production as part of global production networks that transforms and deconstructs the nationalist economic lens. Such a move embodies a politics of international solidarity creating the space for pan-national connections between workers in China and the United States necessary to challenge and reshape both discourse & economic structure.

Hart-Landsberg & Burkett 2006

Martin, Professor of Economics and Director of the Political Economy Program at Lewis and Clark College, Paul, professor of economics at Indiana State University, China and the Dynamics of Transnational Accumulation: Causes and Consequences of Global Restructuring, Historical Materialism, volume 14:3 (3–43)

The data does indeed show that China has achieved unprecedented rates of growth and that its economic transformation has greatly inﬂuenced the nature and organisation of economic activity in other countries. However, we reject the mainstream understanding of the Chinese experience highlighted above and the commonly derived political conclusions. To begin with, we do not believe that China’s economic experience or the resulting restructuring of other economies can be understood in national or even inter-national terms, as if China’s gains create opportunities for policy makers in other countries to promote their own national restructuring in ways that beneﬁt their respective working-class majorities. Rather, we see China’s post-reform economic activity and changes in production processes in other countries being linked and collectively shaped by broader transnational capitalist dynamics, in particular by the establishment and intensiﬁcation of transnational corporate-controlled cross-border production networks. And, far from beneﬁting working people, these dynamics are increasing international imbalances and instabilities as well as heightening competitive pressures that work against the interests of workers in all the countries affected by them, including China. In short, we believe that the conventional wisdom on China presents a ﬂawed picture of global capitalist dynamics and the tensions they generate, one that leaves workers with a set of political options largely limited to passive acceptance of their worsening conditions or a declaration of economic war against their counterparts in other countries, especially China. In contrast, by focusing on the nature and logic of the new transnational accumulation dynamics that are reshaping economic activity in China and other countries, it becomes easier to see the destructive nature of capitalism itself, and the need to build international solidarity and nationally complementary strategies to oppose and overcome it.

#### ---The problem is one of framing. Reinterpreting energy investment actions as specific businesses working within transnational production networks rather than as aggression from a rising Chinese behemoth shatters the notion of a unified Chinese business interest, exposing elite economic exploitation & challenging populist nationalism.

Pan 2007

Chengxin, School of International and Political Studies, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, What Is Chinese About Chinese Business? Implications for U.S. Responses to China’s Rise, Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers

While such anti-China rhetoric and policies are lent credibility and urgency by the frightening image of a rising Chinese behemoth, I argue that these nationalistic economic policies are frequently unjustified, misguided, and even dangerous. To begin with, those policies do not necessarily serve America’s national interests as alleged. More often than not, as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce admitted, industry-specific or region-specific interests have been ‘miscast as homeland security or national security imperatives’ (Hawkins 2006:7). For example, the interests that the Schumer-Graham bill would best serve are more likely those of the textile industry in South Carolina, Graham’s home state. Similarly, it cannot just be pure coincidence that the author of a House resolution demanding a national security review of CNOOC’s bids of Unocal, House Resources Committee Chairman Richard Pombo, is from the district where the headquarters of Chevron, CNOOC’s rival bidder, are located (Weisman 2005:D1). Should these ‘China’ problems be framed in terms of specific business issues, which I think they are, they would have lost much of their galvanising impact on the government or the general public.

#### **---The elimination of investment restrictions is a critical challenge to American economic unilateralism. The elimination of Exon-Florio restrictions is not an affirmation of free trade systems but rather a strategic move to avoid the assimilation of leftist politics into the Pentagon’s efforts at “containing” China.**

Bello, executive director of Focus on the Global South, & Mittal, co-director of the Oakland-based Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2000

Walden, Anuradha, Dangerous Liaisons: Progressives, the Right, and the Anti-China Trade Campaign, Institute for Food and Development Policy/Food First, May, http://www.tni.org/archives/archives\_bello\_china

A coalition of forces seeks to deprive China of permanent normal trading relations (PNTR) as a means of obstructing that country's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). We do not approve of the free-trade paradigm that underpins NTR status. We do not support the WTO; we believe, in fact, that it would be a mistake for China to join it. But the real issue in the China debate is not the desirability or undesirability of free trade and the WTO. The real issue is whether the United States has the right to serve as the gatekeeper to international organizations such as the WTO. More broadly, it is whether the United States government can arrogate to itself the right to determine who is and who is not a legitimate member of the international community. The issue is unilateralism-the destabilizing thrust that is Washington's oldest approach to the rest of the world. The unilateralist anti-China trade campaign enmeshes many progressive groups in the US in an unholy alliance with the right wing that, among other things, advances the Pentagon's grand strategy to contain China. It splits a progressive movement that was in the process of coming together in its most solid alliance in years. It is, to borrow Omar Bradley's characterization of the Korean War, "the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time".

#### ---Working within technocratic structure to reform the production process is the only way to hold corporate energy interests accountable and democratize American energy policy.

Rahman 2011

K. Sabeel, A.B., Harvard College, 2005; M.Sc., Economics for Development, Oxford University, 2006; M.St., Sociolegal Studies, Oxford University, 2007; J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, Class of 2012; Ph.D. Candidate, Government, Harvard University, ENVISIONING THE REGULATORY STATE: TECHNOCRACY, DEMOCRACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENTATION IN THE 2010 FINANCIAL REFORM AND OIL SPILL STATUTES, http://www.harvardjol.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Rahman\_Note.pdf

These weaknesses of the technocratic model create a fundamental challenge for the modern regulatory state. One response to this challenge might be to abandon the project of regulatory public policy altogether. This is the familiar response from laissez-faire ideologies and anti-government conservatism. Yet the social goals that regulation aims to advance remain vital, even if the technocratic model itself proves problematic. As a society, we still need some form of accountability for the actions of powerful private entities like oil and financial corporations. We also require systems to protect against broad social risks like financial crisis and ecological disaster. In short, we require a form of collective self-rule against crises and social evils. Rather than rejecting the goal of mitigating these challenges, the weaknesses of technocratic regulation drive us towards the need to develop an alternative democratic paradigm of regulation. Indeed, these weaknesses of the technocratic impulse—disparities in interest representation, obfuscation of normative debates, demobilization of engagement—share three key features that suggest the need for and viability of a more democratic framework for regulatory politics. First, each of these weaknesses can be overcome through a more democratic regulatory structure. Second, this turn to democracy need not involve a rejection of expertise; rather, some form of democratic politics can coexist with a role for technical expertise. Third, each of these weaknesses arises out of an effort to rationalize regulatory policy. This rationalization effort aims to protect policymaking from the influence of politics, subsuming questions of values and interests into a more coherent process of regulatory policymaking. This good governance ideal is attractive, but the effort to sterilize policy of politics threatens deeper ideals of democracy, responsiveness, and legitimacy. Further, as critics of the modern regulatory state have noted, the involvement of politics is inescapable; regulatory agencies should be structured not to avoid politics but rather to engage with the reality of political disagreement openly. Instead of focusing on the narrow question of agency discretion and constraint with an eye towards promoting rationality of policymaking, the central question should be bringing the foci of political debate to the forefront and engaging in those debates in a democratic manner. Rather than attempting to sterilize policy of politics, this approach looks for ways to constitute a dynamic political process, one that leaves ample room for the representation and engagement of different values.

#### ---Locating oil and natural gas investment from Chinese businesses within global production networks creates greater sensitivity to the uneven distribution of value and power in the global production processes and is a prerequisite to challenging inequality.

Pan 2009

Chengxin, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the ‘rise of China’ in global production networks, Journal of Contemporary China, 18(58), January, 7–25

The complexities of the identity of Chinese businesses are reflected in both the extensive intermingling of ‘non-local’ or ‘non-Chinese’ businesses with their ‘Chinese’ counterparts and, as a result of such processes, the fragmentation of the apparently ‘homogeneous’ Chinese businesses. As a consequence, the conventional assumption of their exclusive Chineseness seems no longer able to do justice to these complexities. Relying on the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis, the statecentric assumption is not only prone to a blindness to the transnational dimension of the Chinese economy, but also tends to exaggerate Chinese power in the global political economy,25 or even mistake China for a model for national economic development. As Hart-Landsberg and Burkett point out, China’s economic experience cannot be understood ‘in national or even inter-national terms, as if China’s gains create opportunities for policy makers in other countries to promote their own national restructuring in ways that benefit their respective working-class majorities’.26 In other words, economic development in China, far from being predominantly a national phenomenon, has a distinctively transnational or global dimension. This transnationality is characteristic of many sectors of the Chinese economy, but the main focus here will be on manufacturing, not least because this sector, directly linked to the ‘Made in China’ phenomenon, has attracted most attention in mainstream media and scholarship. The paper utilizes the global production networks (GPN) framework to examine the transnational characteristics of Chinese manufacturing businesses. Global production networks are a form of contemporary capitalist development that increasingly involves ‘the detailed disaggregation of stages of production and consumption across national boundaries, under the organizational structure of densely networked firms or enterprises’.27 Leading the way of this development are modern multinational companies, whose strategies, as Kenichi Ohmae argues, ‘are no longer shaped and conditioned by reasons of state but, rather, by the desire—and the need—to serve attractive markets wherever they exist and to tap attractive pools of resources wherever they sit’.28 Not surprisingly, these strategies lead to the continued expansion of the capitalist production networks to a global scale. As a result, the social origins and production of various production materials, labor, capital, information, technology, design, management, marketing, and consumption are no longer rigidly tied to fixed, singular localities or nationalities, thus making it increasingly difficult and problematic, if not impossible, to identify businesses and their practices in exclusively national terms. With its emphasis on production and its transnational processes, the GPN framework allows a better understanding of the ‘intricate links—horizontal, diagonal, as well as vertical’ that form ‘multidimensional, multi-layered lattices of economic activity’.29 In doing so, the GPN framework adopted here does not endorse a neoliberal rosy picture of globalization as a worldwide process of economic and cultural convergence. Quite the contrary, it allows greater sensitivity to the uneven distribution of value and power across nations, regions, and classes in global production processes. As far as the organization of economic activities is concerned, national boundary, ethnicity, and domestic political governance are far from disappearing or becoming totally irrelevant. It is just that the whole spectrum of economic activities is becoming less neatly confined to those traditional boundaries. To the extent that power and production (particularly in its conventional sense of manufacturing) often do not coincide or converge on the same geographical space, separate national categories are no longer so useful in the face of the multiple, unstable identities of businesses and economies.

#### ---Fiat is the best vehicle to change politics --- Imagining the impossible but unquestionably reasonable change to CIFUS procedures alters the collective political coordinates of institutional structure to make the impossible possible.

Swyngedouw 2011

Eric, Interrogating post-democratization: Reclaiming egalitarian political spaces, Political Geography (2011), doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.08.001

Second, attention needs to turn to the modalities of repoliticization. Re-politicizing space as an intervention in the state of the situation that transforms and transgresses the symbolic orders of the existing condition marks a shift from the old to a new situation, one that cannot any longer be thought of in terms of the old symbolic framings. For Zizek, such a political act does not start ‘from the art of the possible, but from the art of the impossible’ (Zizek, 1999). Proper politics is thus about practices that lie beyond the symbolic order of the police; about demands that cannot be symbolized within the frame of reference of the police and, therefore, would necessitate transformation in and of the police to permit symbolization to occur. Yet, these are demands and claims that are eminently sensible and feasible when the frame of the symbolic order is shifted, when the parallax gap between what is (the constituted symbolic order of the police) and what can be (the reconstituted symbolic order made possible through a shift in vantage points, one that starts from the partisan universalizing principle of equality). This is the democratic political process through which equality is asserted and that requires the transformation of socio-physical space and the institution of a radically different partition of the sensible (Zizek,1999). The form of politicization predicated upon universalizing egalibertarian demands cuts directly through the radical politics that characterize many contemporary forms of resistance. This could be glimpsed in the democratizing outbursts in the streets of Tunis, Athens or Madrid in 2011. It is also the sort of demand expressed when undocumented and other immigrants in Europe or the US claim their egalibertarian place.

#### ---The success of dialectical political confrontation over the resolution at transforming what’s considered politically feasible to result in real world change is empirically proven.

Mitchell 2010

Gordon R., Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/Mitchell2010.pdf

Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, “Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects.” 54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard’s concept of argumentative “epistemics” to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. this would by no means sideline or even exclude scientiic assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation. 55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, “If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work.” 56 Here, an institution’s need for “strategically located allies” to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of “switch-side public debate” 57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical beneit for student participants, and irst-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientiic artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production. 58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication ield’s performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a dif erent route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism’s tendency to locate its foundations in the English ield’s tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.

## \*\*\*2AC

### 2AC A2: Terrorism DA

#### ---Fear of terrorism collapses the political resulting in wars of annihilation --- The lack of identifiable enemy subject results in global psychosis.

Reinhard 2004

Kenneth, UCLA, Towards a Political-Theology of the Neighbor (Draft), Google Cache

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation-states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stablility, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia. Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous – forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83). **These lines**, first published in 1994, **seem prophetic in a post 9/11 world where we see an America desperately unsure about** both **its enemies and its friends**, **and hence deeply uncertain about itself**. Since America’s renegade war in Iraq, the friendly status of many of its traditional allies has been questioned; and countries that not long ago were on the other side of an “Iron Curtain” are now friends, part of the new “alliance of the willing.” But **who is the enemy**? Is it Osama bin Laden? Saddam Hussein? Kim Chong-il? **These figures have proven endlessly shifting and evanescent in their mediated realities and extraordinarily difficult to either maintain as enemies or to extirpate**. The rhetoric of the so-called “war on terror” is a sign of the disappearance of the traditional, localizable enemy: the terrorist does not have the stabilizing function that Schmitt associates with the enemy, but to declare war on him is to attempt to resuscitate him, to breathe life into the animus of the enemy.

### 2AC T – Restrictions

#### ---we meet-foreign investment restrictions are on production

Hirsch-former senior energy program adviser for Science Applications International Corporation-11

Commentary: Restrictions on world oil production <http://www.energybulletin.net/stories/2011-03-28/commentary-restrictions-world-oil-production>

Restrictions on world oil production can be divided into four categories: 1. Geology 2. Legitimate National Interests 3. Mismanagement 4. Political Upheaval Consider each in reverse order: Political upheaval is currently rampant across the Middle East, resulting in a major spike in world oil prices. No one knows how far the impacts will go or how long it will take to reach some kind of stability and what that stability will mean to oil production in the Middle Eastern countries that produce oil. We are thus relegated to best guesses, which span weeks, months, or years before there are clear resolutions. One pre-Middle East chaos country limited by political upheaval is Iraq, which is believed to have the oil reserves to produce at a much higher level, but Iraqi government chaos has severely limited oil production expansion. In another long-standing case, Nigeria has been plagued by internal political strife, which has negatively impacted its oil production. Mismanagement of oil production within a country can be due to a variety of factors, all of which mean lower oil production than would otherwise be the case. Venezuela is the poster child of national mismanagement. The country has huge resources of heavy oil that could be produced at much higher rates. Underproduction is due to the government syphoning off so much cash flow that oil production operations are starved for needed funds. In addition, Venezuela has made it extremely difficult, if not impossible for foreign oil companies to operate in the country. Another example of mismanagement is Mexico, where government confiscation of oil revenues, substandard technology, and restrictions on foreign investment has led to significant Mexican oil production decline.

#### ---The plan specifies that it removes restrictions only on the production stage. There is no other way to read it and the plan should be the ultimate arbiter of this question.

#### ---We meet – we are a prohibitory access restriction

Voss 12 (CJ Attorney at Stoel Rives LLP) September 24, 2012 "Energy Law Alert: CFIUS Intervenes in Chinese-Owned Wind Project" http://www.stoel.com/showalert.aspx?Show=9813)

On July 25, 2012, CFIUS issued an Order Establishing Interim Mitigation Measures requiring Ralls to cease further construction and operation of the Oregon Projects, remove all stockpiled or stored items from the Oregon Project sites, and cease access to the sites except to the extent required to remove stored or stockpiled property. In an amended order, dated August 2, 2012, CFIUS modified its prior order, adding further restrictions on Ralls's activities, including a prohibition on the sale or transfer of the Oregon Projects to any third party for the purpose of installing any Sany products and restrictions on the sale or transfer of the equity or assets of the Oregon Projects.

#### ---Mitigation agreements are access restrictions.

Zaring, Law Prof at Penn, 09 (David, Assistant Professor, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School, CFIUS AS A CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION SERVICE, Nov, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 81)

To be sure, determining a "law of CFIUS" is not easy. The Committee's legal mandate is replete with discretion. CFIUS is specifically charged with the task of reviewing proposed foreign acquisitions to determine whether they will impair "national security," 8 and the Committee has said the term "is to be interpreted broadly and without limitation to particular industries," its scope lying wholly "within the President's discretion." 9 Prospective foreign acquirers first submit their deals to the Committee for an evaluation over a thirty-day period, and if CFIUS is concerned enough to investigate further, a subsequent forty-five-day window exists. 10 After this evaluation period, the Committee must send a recommendation to the president, who can then either block the transaction or permit it to go forward. 11 CFIUS may recommend blockage to the president or refuse to approve the deal unless the acquiring company agrees to a variety of conditions, such as preventing foreigners from accessing the operations of the target asset, guaranteeing law enforcement access to the firm's resources, and so on. 12 These conditions take the form of "mitigation agreements," so called because the acquirer agrees to take the steps to [\*85] "mitigate any threat to ... national security." 13

#### ---Counter-interpretation—restrictions include limiting conditions

Plummer 29 J., Court Justice, MAX ZLOZOWER, Respondent, v. SAM LINDENBAUM et al., Appellants Civ. No. 3724COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT100 Cal. App. 766; 281 P. 102; 1929 Cal. App. LEXIS 404September 26, 1929, Decided, lexis

The word "restriction," when used in connection with the grant of interest in real property, is construed as being the legal equivalent of "condition." Either term may be used to denote a limitation upon the full and unqualified enjoyment of the right or estate granted. The words "terms" and "conditions" are often used synonymously when relating to legal rights. "Conditions and restrictions" are that which limits or modifies the existence or character of something; a restriction or qualification. It is a restriction or limitation modifying or destroying the original act with which it is connected, or defeating, terminating or enlarging an estate granted; something which defeats or qualifies an estate; a modus or quality annexed by him that hath an estate, or interest or right to the same, whereby an estate may be either defeated, enlarged, or created upon an uncertain event; a quality annexed to land whereby an estate may be defeated; a qualification or restriction annexed to a deed or device, by virtue of which an estate is made to vest, to be enlarged or defeated upon the happening or not happening of a particular event, or the performance or nonperformance of a particular act.

#### ---These limiting conditions are de-facto prohibitions because they set the bar too high on production

Marchick 07 (David, partner at Covington & Burling, where he advises

companies on the CFIUS process, “Swinging the Pendulum too Far: An Analysis of the CFIUS Process Post-Dubai Ports World,” Jan, http://www.nfap.net/researchactivities/studies/NFAPPolicyBriefCFIUS0107.pdf)

As Figure 4 (see Appendix) shows, jobs associated with foreign investment grew rapidly between 1985 and 2000 but have since dropped by 10 percent. While data are not yet available for 2005 and 2006, non-official data suggests that 2006 was a record year for overall merger and acquisition activity and there was strong growth of foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies in the United States, although foreign investment levels remain well below levels in 2000. Despite the apparent increase in foreign investment in 2006, one has to ask whether the overall level of foreign investment in the United States would not have been even greater in the absence of the uncertainty created by the Dubai Ports controversy. Indeed, as Figure 3 shows, merger and acquisition activity globally and between U.S. companies has grown much faster than the growth rate of foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies. Anecdotal evidence among investment bankers and CFIUS attorneys suggests that a number of significant foreign acquisitions did not go forward in 2006 due to concerns about CFIUS. These transactions did not go forward either because the foreign investor did not want to go through the CFIUS process or because of concerns that conditions imposed by CFIUS would have put them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis their American competitors.

#### ---Their interpretation over limits-There are very few actual “prohibitions on production”. Incentives have been gutted by the states counterplan-err on the side of affirmative innovation and not DOD SMRs. They exclude regulatory obstacles that de-facto block production which is the heart of the literature.

#### ---Reasonability---The affirmative removes a significant obstacle to production on both OIL AND GAS. You should evaluate topicality like a disad and make them win a real ground and limits impact argument about the aff.

### 2AC Narrowing Counterplan

#### This isn’t what carroll advocates at all…Zero solvency

Carroll-Emory International Law Review-9

23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167 COMMENT: BACK TO THE FUTURE: REDEFINING THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACT'S CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

This proposed definition of national security would be even more limited than the original Exon-Florio signed by President Reagan, as Exon-Florio was designed to apply mainly to defense-based technological acquisitions.223 The main difference between this definition of national security and the original Exon-Florio legislation is that this definition would codify national security to explicitly prevent protectionist use of the CFIUS for political ends. Any consideration of economic security or protection of energy assets from foreign acquisition would be excluded from this definition, as inclusion of such economic factors can only encourage protectionism and politicization of the CFIUS process.224

#### Doesn’t solve any of the critical impacts

Carroll-Emory International Law Review-9

23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167 COMMENT: BACK TO THE FUTURE: REDEFINING THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACT'S CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

On July 26, 2007, President Bush signed FINSA into law.120 The new legislation modified Exon-Florio in several aspects, most notably by broadening the definition of national security to encompass “homeland security,” and also by including critical infrastructure, energy assets, and critical technologies under the umbrella of FINSA.121 FINSA added the Secretary of Energy as a voting member of the CFIUS122 and made investigations mandatory when either an acquisition is made by an entity controlled by a foreign government or the transaction could result in the control of any critical infrastructure, including major energy assets, by a foreign business.123 This requirement is excepted if the Secretary of the Treasury and the head of the lead agency jointly determine that the transaction will not impair national security.124 Thus, the burden of proof to show that a controlling acquisition of “critical infrastructure” does not threaten national security has arguably shifted from the government to the companies.125 FINSA does define critical infrastructure as “assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating impact on national security.”126 But this definition still allows uncertainty, as the federal government has promulgated multiple evolving and expanding definitions of what constitutes critical infrastructure,127 which could encompass more than a quarter of the national economy.128 The Treasury regulations implementing FINSA do not attempt to define or limit the scope of critical infrastructure.129 Such a broad grab of power for the CFIUS by Congress represents a major intervention into the economy with potentially negative consequences for foreign direct investment.130 FINSA also includes a requirement that the CFIUS file a report with Congress at the completion of any 30-day review or 45-day investigation,131 which increases transparency and the likelihood of congressional involvement.

#### Anything can be considered a military threat

Carroll-Emory International Law Review-9

23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167 COMMENT: BACK TO THE FUTURE: REDEFINING THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACT'S CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Senator Charles Schumer’s call to investigate the Borse Company’s purchase of a 20% interest in Nasdaq demonstrates the broad nature of the FINSA review.134 Although the Borse Company is a holding company owned by the Emir of Dubai,135 at first glance, there appears to be no conceivable relation between a Nasdaq purchase and national security. Critics of the Unocal deal claimed that the United States military uses oil,136 and critics of the Dubai Ports acquisition claimed that terrorists could infiltrate United States ports through the U.A.E. company.137 Schumer does not seem to have proof of any plausible threat of terrorism due to the purchase, and Nasdaq has no apparent relationship to the defense industrial base. The only conceivable portion of Exon-Florio that a partial Nasdaq acquisition could fall under is the critical infrastructure provision added in FINSA. Of course, if an electronic stock trading company can constitute critical infrastructure, then nearly any portion of the U.S. economy could qualify as such, and by extension, the vast majority of foreign direct investment within the United States would be potentially vulnerable to similar scrutiny.

#### the counterplan doenst limit congresses ability to be involved in transactions- means the CP doesn’t solve politicization

Carroll-Emory International Law Review-9

23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167 COMMENT: BACK TO THE FUTURE: REDEFINING THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACT'S CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

FINSA mandates that the CFIUS conduct a 45-day investigation any time the foreign investor is controlled by, or acting on behalf of, a foreign government, unless the Secretary of the Treasury and the head of the relevant agency both agree that there is no threat to national security and waive the investigation.183 This provision shifts the burden of proof away from the U.S. government and to the foreign state-owned business in these transactions.184 To foreign governments, however, FINSA may appear to discourage investment because of political enmity.185 As such, continual politicized investigations of foreign direct investment in American infrastructure may alienate our allies and isolate America even further.186

#### We solve Iran – allowing China to invest in the U.S. solves shift

#### And

#### Framing the middle east as a zone of instability in need of US intervention is grounded in a deeper imperial project that sees middle eastern social relations as unstable and in need of change, this reproduces their impacts by inflaming resentment and risks extinction.

JOYA 2005 – PHD CANDIDATE YORK U

*THEORIZING US IMPERIAL STRATEGIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST*, YCISS PAPER # 37, DECEMBER

While the establishment of monopoly control over Middle Eastern oil and energy2 is often posited as the main motivation for the American invasion of Iraq, the role of the US within the current international system and the extent of its military might and presence around the world suggests that the US has other grander designs for the Middle East. More specifically, using the pretext of 9/11, the US has embarked on a project of **disciplining the Middle Eastern states** to follow and respect the logic of the capitalist market.3 This goal of securing the world for capital flows, the US believes, can be achieved once democracy, the rule of law, and free market mechanisms are firmly put in place in the disconnected regions4 of the world. Although the nature of US imperialism is multifaceted (economic, cultural, ideological), I intend to explore mainly the economic aspect of US imperialist rule through an examination of how such imperialism deepens the integration of Middle Eastern societies into the capitalist world market. To get a grasp of the current nature of US imperial rule and its plans for the Middle East, it is important to historicize and contextualize post war relations between the US and Middle East within an expanding and changing capitalist world market. I argue that while throughout the cold war period, US imperialism in the Middle East took the form of direct and indirect intervention with the goal of preventing independent, noncapitalist development, the post-Cold War project of US imperialism involves an active remaking of Middle Eastern states. In order to achieve security for capital flows in the region, the US aims to transform the political, economic, and juridical landscapes of the region to integrate fully these societies into the global market. This shift in American policy has come as a response to the rising threats from different forms of resistance emerging within Middle Eastern societies. An examination of the history of the region is instructive in telling us that such a design will create further instability to capital flows given that the designs of the US, despite being enveloped in the language of freedom and democracy, cannot resolve the contradictions arising from the liberalization of the region. **The Middle East**, while of great economic value to the US and to transnational capital, **poses the greatest risk to American imperial designs given that the US has not been able to achieve an ideological hegemony in this region**. In the absence of redistributive reforms, and with an increase in austerity measures, we will continue to witness protests and contestation of not only US imperialism, but also of the local states in the region. In this paper, I argue that the shift in the US policy is an indication of active US interest in transforming the existing social relations in the Middle East in order to integrate the region **fully into the capitalist world market**. Secure and sustained capital accumulation requires enforcement of contracts, the rule of law and the defence of and respect for private property. Hence, the project of the US in the Middle East entails the institutionalization of liberal rights for capital accumulation whereby popular dissent and protest would become neutralized through their absorption in formal political institutions.5 In other words, the Middle East is set to embrace crucial elements of a liberal democratic system whereby we might see a remaking of the Middle Eastern political, economic, and judicial maps.6 Besides giving US corporations access to its massive oil reserves and reconstruction funds,7 Iraq plays an important role as part of the larger strategic goals of the US in the Middle East. I will conclude by critically analyzing US imperial rule in the region. While historically empires have displayed many similar traits, the American empire differs from all previous empires. First, unlike past empires, it has not relied on direct territorial rule (even in the case of Iraq, as it returned sovereignty to the people of Iraq last year), but has rather maintained its rule through the establishment of institutions (such as the World Trade Organization) that have locked states into a set of US established rules. Second, relying on these intuitions, it has been attempting to establish and maintain a formal separation of the economic sphere from the political sphere, which has been increasingly taking a universal and global form, especially under the new imperial strategies of the Bush administration. This, I would argue is the grand design of the US for the Middle East, whereby guarantees of security for private property, private investment, and the rule of capital will be achieved through institutionalizing liberal democracy. While it remains the goal of the US to achieve this degree of peace, order, and security for capital investment and market expansion, one cannot ignore the neo-liberal contradictions that have been unfolding in the region in the last twenty-five years. It is this complex dialectical relationship that needs further analysis and discussion. Although I also briefly touch on insecurities generated in the region due to the range of reforms that are prescribed for Middle Eastern societies, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss that aspect of US imperialism in detail. CONTINUES…  The Post Cold War Era and the Shift in American Policy towards the Middle East In the post Cold War era two different phases were observed in US policy towards the Middle East. The first phase was marked by the politics of diplomacy and the use of economic sanctions during the Clinton administration. However, the second phase of US foreign policy was openly aggressive towards states that did not adhere to free market policies and notions of liberal democracy, as understood by the Bush neo-con administration.21 Perry Anderson captured very well these two phases of US foreign policy. He writes that while America’s global strategy remained unchanged at the turn of the century, the only change observed was the means through which America pursued its interests. While during the Clinton era American foreign policy functioned under the banner of human rights, democracy and freedom, under George W. Bush it is the war on terror that has become the modus operandi of American foreign policy. While free markets, free elections, and liberal democracy are elements that the USA wants to export to the Middle East, the manner in which these will be achieved is a reflection of the shift in American imperial strategy on a global level. This shift I would argue, marks a radical phase in the remaking of the Middle East, something that is observable in US economic and **aid policies towards the region**. Since the end of the Cold War, US aid has been closely tied to free market reforms and the dismantling of the state sector. Additionally, in the 1980s, both **US** and IMF **responses to** Third World debt crisis took the form of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Since late 1990s both parties have shifted in their prescriptions for the Third world (including **the Middle East**), demanding radical changes in not only how Third world economies are managed, but demanding a range of political and legal reforms as well. IMF policy papers of 2003 indicate the range of reforms that have been imposed on Middle Eastern governments. As well, the areas of intervention of IFIs have increased radically, including public sector reform, transparency and good governance, financial market development, trade liberalization, monetary policy, and reform of the exchange rate, all of which are to facilitate integration into the global economy. As for the post conflict societies, the IMF and other international institutions are involved even more deeply, drafting and developing constitutions and policies to facilitate the building of the private sector (Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq). Hence**, the current reforms are** more **thorough and aim to radically transform the nature of social relations in Middle Eastern societies.**While the contradictions of liberalization continued to unfold in the form of wealth polarization, massive unemployment and environmental crisis (water privatization), the IMF and World Bank continued offering the same prescriptions for the Middle Eastern states: stronger doses of privatization, further deregulation, more liberalization and the opening up of markets. It will come as no surprise that a stronger phase of **liberalizing reforms and austerity programs would further intensify social, ethnic, and national conflicts** in the Middle East (Algeria, Syria and Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan – 1980s onwards, Yemen 1990s). Social conflicts have been widespread in the mentioned countries especially after the economic reforms that put at risk or destroyed the livelihood of a large number of people. As has been noted, protest movements in the Middle East and North Africa have been in response to retrenchment of the public sector, through massive privatization and deregulation. David Seddon notes a series of riots and rebellions of the poor against globalization in Tunisia, Morocco, and Sudan. The 1980s coincided with the debt crisis, as many popular protests against governments, the IMF and the World Bank took place in a number of North African and Middle Eastern countries. While the 1970s economic crises and price hikes triggered protests from the poor segments of society, the 1980s crises elicited harsher responses from both the poor as well as the middle classes due to the privatization of the public sector. Clearly, the 1980s marked a shift in the nature of protests as they were mostly organized by the unemployed or by the public sector employees who were resisting the dismantling of the state in the face of pressures of globalization.22 The set of reforms that began in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, in fact, intensified in the post-Cold War era. We will now turn to these new developments in the imperialist strategies towards the Middle East in the post-Cold War period. What is New? The **U**nited **S**tates, with its veto power in the UN and its unrivalled position within the IMF and the World Bank, **has been adamantly pursuing imperialist policies across the world.** With the decline of the USSR, the way was cleared up for it to act unilaterally, while effectively bypassing all conditions and rules of international law. In this manner, the post Cold War era began with a clearly interventionist and strong US state displaying its global power with its first war on Iraq in 1991, while at the same time challenging European states by extending NATO powers to Eastern Europe. The new aspect of American imperialism is the intertwining of liberal internationalism (global governance and institutions) **with the realist concerns of anarchy and security**within the second Bush Administration.23 The consequence of this shift for the Middle East arguably **has been the renewed significance of liberal democratic institutio**ns that would facilitate market functioning and result in the so-called security and prosperity, both for the region and for the world.24 Of all the regions of the world, the Middle East presents a great obstacle to establishing institutions that facilitate the free flow of capital. It then comes as no surprise when the National Endowment for Democracy (NED hereafter) has been busy launching projects for promoting free enterprise in multiple Middle Eastern countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco so far). What is astonishing is the degree to which the push towards market reform is enveloped in the language of freedom and democracy. In addition, the Bush administration has been constantly reminding Americans and the world of the strong correlation between peace (non-violence) and free **enterprise, which in turn legitimizes pre-emptive American interventions in the Middle East**.2

5 Underlying America’s imperialist policies is the reconstituting of the political, legal, and economic landscapes in the region**, all under the rubric of security** and democracy. **These goals of American policy are in unison with the conditionalities** set by the World Bank and IMF for the Third World. These demands are often phrased in the following terms: good governance, a small state sector and the opening up of the economy in order to attract foreign and domestic investors. The goal of these IFIs is not simply to dismantle the public sector due to inefficiency; rather their aim seems to be that of sowing the roots of market mechanisms in the Middle East, whereby the supremacy of capital over labour becomes formally institutionalized. Furthermore, in terms of social relations, the current attempts of the US and other capitalist interests in the Middle East seems to be to revamp and reshape this region in a manner that would guarantee accumulation without creating or causing any uncertainties (the CATO institute lies at the centre of this push towards radical free market reforms in the Middle East). It is clear from the range of official US government documents and from the right wing think tanks, that **Middle Eastern ruling elites are provided with a single option and that is to embrace liberal democratic reforms** (competing political parties, free and regular elections, free media, private property, rule of law, and withdrawal of the state form its redistributive functions while fully privatizing their economies). If these reforms are not implemented, just as in the case of Iraq, **the US threatens to intervene more directly to bring ‘democracy’ to ‘the people’ of the Middle East.** Fear of being removed from power, Middle Eastern governments have complied with US demands, although only to the degree that their power is not compromised. They have been actively expanding the reach of capital investment within their territories while at the same time curbing their own redistributive role.26 To create an investment friendly environment, governments have kept a tight hold on labour as a condition for higher investment opportunities. As Soederberg points out, there is not much new in the renewed Washington consensus in terms of US demands from the Third world states and societies: From the outset of the debt crises in the early 1980s to the late 1990s the form of the official development agenda has been marked by the Washington consensus…Working under the assumption that states should relinquish all power, except for guaranteeing and enforcing the rule of law (such as private property rights, free repatriation of profits, and so forth) to the rational forces of the marketplace over states, the prescriptions of the Washington consensus sought to implement sound economic policy and market friendly reforms....27 What the US intends to achieve in the Middle East in the twenty-first century is somewhat similar to what it did in the immediate post war period. That is, the aim of US power is to integrate the Middle East into the global economy in a fashion whereby abiding by the rules of the world market would become a responsibility of the states in the Middle East. Perhaps the ‘newness’ is **marked in the method** of achieving an expanding range of goals both old and new. I have identified the new means as the reorganization of domestic political, economic, and juridical institutions with the constant threat of military intervention in cases of noncompliance. The other aspect of US demands entails the **maintenance of security** within the national borders of these **states**. From the range of policies proposed to the Middle Eastern regimes, the US has now recognized that without political reform economic reforms will lead to instability. This was first mentioned in the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ as part of *Rebuilding America’s Defenses* project in 200028 and has been reiterated by Thomas Barnette. The United States believes that dissent can be absorbed through political reform, something that the elite would resist as it would destroy the basis of their power by creating space for political struggles.29 The New Millennium and the New Face of Imperialism *A country’s potential to warrant a U.S. military response is inversely related to its globalization connectivity. There is a good reason why Al Qaeda was based first in Sudan and then later in Afghanistan: These are two of the most disconnected countries in the world.*- Thomas Barnette 2003. George W. Bush has also reiterated the link that Thomas Barnett draws between the disconnectedness of societies from the global economy and violence on many occasions. It is suggested that globalization and further integration into the global economy is the key to reduced violence, more security, prosperity, **and stability**. In its global constabulary role, the US seems adamant in bringing this change in the Middle East, albeit masked under the banner of democracy and freedom. The new US policy in the Middle East announced by Bush in November 2003 pursues a ‘forward strategy of freedom’ throughout the Middle East: Promoting democracy and freedom in the Middle East will be a massive and difficult undertaking, but it is worthy of America’s effort and sacrifice. As long as freedom and democracy do not flourish in the Middle East, that region will remain stagnant, resentful, and violent-and serve as an exporter of violence and terror to free nations.30 Freedom, as stated above, means freedom of capital, freedom of the market and freedom of commodities to circulate around the world. It is hard to find evidence of how such mechanisms would solve the deeper problems of the poor or the unemployed. Rather than addressing the root causes of violence, and the resentful attitudes towards the US and other capitalist powers, America’s policy of transplanting freedom and democracy is intent on bringing market reform, security and stability for investors in the Middle East. The common goal of the US then **seems to be to connect the *disconnected* societies to the *connected* part of the world.** If achieved, it is argued that it will solve a number of problems such as poverty, resentment towards the West, social conflicts, political frustration, etc. This shift in American policy is reflected in the increasing influence of neo-cons on American foreign policy such as the Cato institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the National Endowment for Democracy. Clearly, American demands from the rest of the world are ridden by neo-con right wing ideology. This ideology centres on a blind faith in the role of free enterprise and the market as perfect allocators of resources. Nothing other than the market can be tolerated and this particular side of the Bush administration was exposed in the actions of Paul Bremmer, who rewrote the Iraqi constitution, removing all obstacles to the development of private property. The realities in Iraq since then have proven that such ideologically motivated plans will not be realized easily.31 Under the current US administration, the project for economic and political liberalization is packaged in the language of democracy and freedom. **This project is further linked with the need for security and peace** in the North. As stated in George W. Bush’s speech, it is widely argued that the West has become the main point of envy of the third world, especially the Middle East. **The only way to deal with this is to globalize the Middle East,** by expanding their global trading capacity, liberalizing investment, and exploring the potential markets of this region. All of this would require the establishing of political institutions, free and competing elections as well as a free judiciary and open, uncensored media. In such a context of transparency and security, global investors would flood Middle Eastern states and the people of the region will finally become able to realize their ultimate potential. Such has been the promises pronounced by the current US president as well as the influential US think tanks. The flip side of this project of the US would reveal the actual interests served by such schemes and designs. It is not the Middle Eastern poor and the ordinary citizens who would benefit mainly from such plans. Rather, it is the domestic and foreign elites and investors scrambling for opportunities to invest their capital that will benefit most from this process of reform. Introducing a wide range of economic, political, and juridical reforms would secure the region by making it easier for private investors to make investment decisions under conditions of political stability and transparency. In addition to this, once opened, Middle Eastern labour, consumers and natural resources present great opportunities for diverse capitalist interests (both US and other).32 The project in short entails uprooting the existing political and economic arrangements and instead putting in place a more rigid, formalized set of institutions that facilitate and enhance accumulation opportunities in the Middle East as well as in the rest of the developing world. CONTINUES… Remaking the Middle East: Regularizing the Irregular through Top-down Reforms The main goal of the US is to reorganize both Iraq and the Middle East in order to facilitate capital accumulation and reducing uncertainties and direct political resistance to US imperialist and global capitalist interests. So far this goal seems far from being achieved. Naomi Klein, in her article, “Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in pursuit of a neo-con utopia,” lays out the imperialist agenda of the US in Iraq. Post-invasion Iraq began with designs to fully privatize every aspect of Iraqi society through rewriting the Iraqi constitution. While this project did not succeed due to resistance both from Iraqi workers and Iraqi business interests, the Bush administration is blindly pursuing its ideological dream of creating a fully free-market Iraq. Beside the immediate interests of US capital, there are other reasons that the invasion of Iraq serves for US imperialism. Tariq Ali provides a summary of the wide range of objectives that the Iraqi invasion would serve. These goals include a show of US power to the rest of the world, especially to rivals such as Russia and China; warning Middle Eastern states to follow orders from the White House; acquiring economic power by controlling oil reserves in Iraq, and finally securing the region by installing an American friendly regime in Iraq. Ali argues that these goals of US imperialism were in the working long before Sept 11th.40 While the above reasons represent a broader set of US objectives, the reconstruction of Iraq is quite significant to the larger US plan for reshaping the Middle East. As Herring and Rangwala write, every aspect of the reconstruction process is marked by transnational capitalist interests who play a central role in remaking Iraq by locking Iraq into international agreements and trade deals. Besides repaying its debt and reparations, Iraqi society has to deal with massive unemployment and poverty. Despite having the world’s second larger reserves of oil, Iraq still applied for IMF loans in September 2004.41 Of course, this loan came with the conditions set by the IMF to develop “Iraq’s fiscal administrative capacity, with the explicit expectation that the increased capacity will be directed towards preparing Iraq for debt management and marketization.”42 Beside the IMF, there are a range of think tanks and neo-con associations who are busy in reshaping the Middle East through both direct and indirect support in shaping institutions and constitutions.43 Iraq’s combined multilateral and bilateral debt inherited from the Saddam era is estimated to be as much as $137 billion. This does not take into account unpaid interest (which could more than double the total) or $30 billion outstanding on reparations awarded by the UNCC and $97.9 billion of claims still to be decided by it.44 Iraq paid arrears to the IMF of US$81 million in order to trigger in September 2004 approval by the IMF of a loan of $436 million in emergency post-conflict assistance. Furthermore, the purpose of the loan is to improve Iraq’s fiscal administrative capacity, with the explicit expectation that the increased capacity will be directed towards preparing Iraq for debt management and marketisation.45 In November 2004, the Paris club of creditor states agreed to write off up to 80% of Iraq’s debt to them by 2008, after protracted negotiations between its 19 members, on the condition of its acceptance of an IMF programme.46 It seems the IMF projects of the 1970s -1980s fell back on their promises of solving the problem of poverty and unemployment. Rather, they unleashed the contradictions of the free market (poverty, unemployment, increased prices of basic commodities). The current phase of liberalization is intended to be more serious in implanting liberal institutions in the region. As such, it is hoped that conflicts would be eliminated through liberal democratic regimes. The pressure on most states and ruling classes currently tend to aim at forcing these states to reconfigure themselves so that they could allow a measure of liberal democratic changes. As Peter Gowan remarks, the current expansion of liberal democracy can be better understood as the expansion of ‘cosmopolitan neoliberalism’, whereby one state (the US) has acquired special prerogatives at the expense of all other states. With such extended powers, the US aims to harmonize and synchronize laws, institutions and political systems across the world.47 We could observe examples of this in Egypt and **Syria** (and Saudi Arabia) where constitutional amendments in a liberal democratic direction have shaped the current political debate in these societies. As Barnett (2003) writes about the shift in American policy and its assertive role in managing globalization: The Middle East is the perfect place to start. **Diplomacy cannot work in a region where the biggest sources of insecurity lie not between states but within them**. What is most wrong about the Middle East is the lack of personal freedom and how that translates into dead-end lives for most of the population — especially for the young.” Stokes points out the contradictions arising from the two responsibilities of the US. He writes that in pursuing its own national capital’s interests, the US state also reproduces global capitalism, in terms of providing public goods globally. To rephrase it otherwise, while it might seem that the US is acting in the general interest of global capital, the reality is that due to the high level of internationalization of US capital, when the US pursues the interests of capital globally, first and foremost, it serves the interests of American capital. This does not mean capital has become transnationalized. It only means US capital’s reach has become internationalized and requires the US to act across the globe.48 It would be naive to assume that the US imperial project for the Middle East is being imposed on the Middle Eastern ruling classes. An analysis of the Arab Human Development Report 2004, which was issued in April 2005, indicates a set of policy suggestions put forth to the Arab elites.49 From the report, it is obvious that, among the elite, academics, and intelligentsia, there is strong support in favour of economic, political, and juridical transformations in the Middle East. This support is counter balanced by other social forces who resist changes that would further erode means of their livelihood and expose Middle Eastern poor to the gyrations of the world market. Obstacles to the US Imperial Project? Naomi Klein has argued that despite the full-fledged push towards integrating Iraq into the global economy, there are real hurdles that would either prevent or radically slow down such a process. The US has not succeeded in winning the hearts of Iraqi people. Beside this failure, the stark reality of poverty, unemployment, and threat to the public sector jobs have led to the formation of different types of popular resistance movements. What chance of success does the US possess in the rest of the Middle East? The track record of the US and IFIs’ push for implementing liberalization has left negative memories among the Middle Eastern populace. Soederberg argues that the era of neo-liberal globalization has reached its point of crisis in the South. She writes, “[t]he dangerous combination of the dwindling levels of public support for marketled restructuring and austerity packages, on the one hand, and shrinking room for manoeuvre regarding national economic and social policy formation, on the other, has led to a crisis of neo-liberal governance in the South.”50 It is also worth noting that throughout the 1980s, the process of economic liberalization was subject to political class struggles in the Middle East and governments were forced to be sensitive in adopting liberalization policies; although at times governments acted with an iron fist and imposed reforms in order to deal with the burden of debt repayments. As a result of the liberalization processes, workers as well as the poor and the unemployed, became more vulnerable to the dictates of global capitalism. It is important to note that such reforms also carried a political cost: namely the decline in legitimacy of Third World ruling elite and the rise of alternative political groups such as Islamic fundamentalists.51 As the distributive functions of the state became eroded and coercive powers of the state became increased, it gives rise to civil wars (in Algeria and Lebanon), riots, protests, and most importantly to the delegitimization of the state. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism as the alternative that emerged represents the nightmare of capitalist powers both in the North and in the South.52 The obstacles that this new phenomenon poses to US global power and its goal of reproducing capitalism is what I will focus on next. The current processes of democratization and liberalization – that is, primitive accumulation – which are heralded and supported by the US and other advanced industrialized countries as a new beginning, have in fact resulted in the erosion of the established social safety nets of Middle Eastern societies, thereby exposing the vulnerable populations of these societies to the uncertainties of financial and labour markets. Phrased differently, the policies of democratization and liberalization ignore the contradictions that are created in these societies by the very process of liberalization itself. Such a degree of liberalization, even if it is under the rubric of democratization, **will further intensify the existing conflicts within these societies.**Human insecurity does not seem to be the target that democratization and liberalization will resolve; rather such insecurity, whether in the form of increased social unrest, urban dislocation, high levels of unemployment, or the emergence of extreme forms of religious fundamentalism and terrorism, constitute the outcomes of such processes of global integration. Just recently, in July 2005 Yemenis massively protested against the removal of oil subsidies, which burdened the poor with high oil prices.53 This point is further reiterated in an excerpt from Soederberg where she points out the failure of neoliberal logic to grasp the contradictions that result from neoliberal globalization, namely human insecurity: The reproduction of neoliberal globalization is not a friction-free process, but fraught with contradictions… Moreover, ‘these processes of profit making, accumulation, and institutional regulation, which give a degree of security to the system, **simultaneously produce insecurity on all levels of social and individual life**.’ The latter may be regarded as the security/insecurity paradox of neoliberal globlization…In the post-Bretton Woods era (1944-71), **American-led imperialism has attempted to straddle the security/insecurity paradox vis-à-vis the South largely through economic and physical (military) coercion,** such as structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the IMF **and militarized postwar reconstruction efforts in, for example, Afghanistan**, Bosnia and Iraq…[N]eoliberal globalization in the form of SAPs has allowed many capitals to reap the benefits of privatized state firms, and easier access to labour, and consumer and credit markets. However, the same modes of export-oriented forms of institutional regulation have led to increasing levels of insecurity, albeit in varying levels, in the South.54 Conclusion In this paper, I examined the relationship between American imperialist policies and the evolution of the Middle East during and after the Cold War. I argued that while the concerns of US policy in the region during the Cold War were mainly issues of the containment of communism in the region and preventing independent paths of development in the Middle East, the post-Cold War era marks a radical shift in US policy towards the Middle Eastern countries. Since the 1980s, with the help of IFIs, US imperialism has been engaged in actively dismantling statist policies in the Middle East while the post Cold War era can be seen as a period of remaking Middle Eastern societies. I have argued that **the current phase of US imperialism in the region aims to restructure not only the economy, but also the political and social spheres**, with the aim of facilitating capital accumulation. The case of Iraq serves as a model in this attempt of the US whereby every aspect of Iraqi society is being divvied up among mainly US and other International corporations and contractors. I have also made the case that such an attempt is not as smooth and easy as imagined by the US. Just as globalization faced active resistance by Middle Eastern populations across different societies, the current design of the US is going to face even more resistance precisely because liberalization does not carry the answer to the problems of poverty and human insecurity in the region. While the promises of globalization have attempted mask the US imperial project of primitive accumulation, the fact that the burden of accumulation is shouldered by the workers and the poor of the Middle East will expose the underlying power relations that characterize the current phase of capitalist expansion. The rightwing, neo-liberal policymakers and capitalist interests tend to establish the following false relationship between ‘open’ economies, liberal democratic freedoms, and reduced violence. They argue that economic freedom goes hand in hand with democratic freedoms, and societies (Western, industrialized) that have these in place, tend to live in peace.55 The Middle East and Africa are both closed and undemocratic and therefore witness large scales of violence. In order to have peace in these regions of the world they need to embrace the logic of the market. Only then citizens of these closed regions will have hope and faith that their condition of poverty and suffering can change. They will no longer, out of envy, resort to violent acts against the well-off in the world, as their frustration would transform into hope. To realize this, these societies need to open up their economies, while also adopting liberal democratic freedoms and rights. As a result, investors will be attracted to these regions, which will lead to an increase in trade and income generating mechanisms.56 The Middle East will become safe for investors while at the same time it will integrate more closely into the world market, resulting in a healthier and rejuvenated capitalist system.57 While the US is strongly pushing for such reforms, there is little evidence of the promised fruits, where wages are low, and unemployment high, housing costs are skyrocketing due to privatization, privatized, and unaffordable health care, none or very little savings as the day to day concerns of survival prevents any thoughts about the future. To conclude, capitalist globalization and imperatives of the world market enforced by American imperialist policies impacts different societies, social groupings and classes unevenly. While the rich often benefit from such processes, the majority poor, unemployed, and unprotected populations carry the risk of losing their livelihood and means of survival. At the same time, the unintended consequence of American imperialist policies pose threats, not only to America but to the rest of the world as alienated and disenfranchised young men and women embrace fundamentalist organizations (both Islamic and non-Islamic). Such is the nature of imperialist venture where **there is always the possibility of implosion of the empire as a result of its own policies.**

### 2AC Neolib/Consumption/Capitalism K

#### ---Scapegoating government restrictions are good --- Even if it falsely distributes blame, it’s a prerequisite to the alternative’s critical knowledge production.

Lohmann 2012

Larry, FINANCIALIZATION, COMMODIFICATIONAND CARBON:THE CONTRADICTIONS OFNEOLIBERAL CLIMATE POLICY, SOCIALIST REGISTER, <http://thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/Socialist%20Register%20Neoliberal%20Climate%20Policy%20Contradictions.pdf>

Scapegoating ideology, however, is as double-edged as its cynical variety, or as the climate commodification process itself. Depending on political circumstances, calls for ‘better regulation’ or ‘crackdowns on corruption’ can intersect fruitfully with the more strategic, long-term campaigns for decommodification of the earth’s carbon-cycling capacity being undertaken by grassroots movements and groups such as Via Campesina, the California Movement for Environmental Justice, and movements in Ecuador, Canada and Nigeria opposing fossil fuel extraction.37 Useful information on patterns of subsidies provided to fossil fuel polluters by the EU ETS, or on the perverse incentives associated with HFC-23 projects, often come from groups clinging to the fetish of reform, and important analyses of the contradictions of the climate commodity from Wall Street consultants who would be horrified at the extent to which their contributions are aiding the understanding of radical movements against the trade. Thus while frank discussion of the consequences of the continuing unfolding of the contradiction between exchange-value and use-value in carbon markets is more politically productive when undertaken with affected publics than with fetish-constrained state officials and technocrats, or in the pages of the financial press, political spaces for breaking the trance that carbon markets have imposed on climate policy can be, and are being, opened at many levels.

#### ---The alternative fails --- Collective structures result in political violence regarding energy addiction

Jensen 2009

Derrick, activist and the author of many books, most recently What We Leave Behind and Songs of the Dead, Forget Shorter Showers, Orion Magazine, <http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/4801/>

WOULD ANY SANE PERSON think dumpster diving would have stopped Hitler, or that composting would have ended slavery or brought about the eight-hour workday, or that chopping wood and carrying water would have gotten people out of Tsarist prisons, or that dancing naked around a fire would have helped put in place the Voting Rights Act of 1957 or the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Then why now, with all the world at stake, do so many people retreat into these entirely personal “solutions”? Part of the problem is that we’ve been victims of a campaign of systematic misdirection. Consumer culture and the capitalist mindset have taught us to substitute acts of personal consumption (or enlightenment) for organized political resistance. An Inconvenient Truth helped raise consciousness about global warming. But did you notice that all of the solutions presented had to do with personal consumption—changing light bulbs, inflating tires, driving half as much—and had nothing to do with shifting power away from corporations, or stopping the growth economy that is destroying the planet? Even if every person in the United States did everything the movie suggested, U.S. carbon emissions would fall by only 22 percent. Scientific consensus is that emissions must be reduced by at least 75 percent worldwide. Or let’s talk water. We so often hear that the world is running out of water. People are dying from lack of water. Rivers are dewatered from lack of water. Because of this we need to take shorter showers. See the disconnect? Because I take showers, I’m responsible for drawing down aquifers? Well, no. More than 90 percent of the water used by humans is used by agriculture and industry. The remaining 10 percent is split between municipalities and actual living breathing individual humans. Collectively, municipal golf courses use as much water as municipal human beings. People (both human people and fish people) aren’t dying because the world is running out of water. They’re dying because the water is being stolen. Or let’s talk energy. Kirkpatrick Sale summarized it well: “For the past 15 years the story has been the same every year: individual consumption—residential, by private car, and so on—is never more than about a quarter of all consumption; the vast majority is commercial, industrial, corporate, by agribusiness and government [he forgot military]. So, even if we all took up cycling and wood stoves it would have a negligible impact on energy use, global warming and atmospheric pollution.” Or let’s talk waste. In 2005, per-capita municipal waste production (basically everything that’s put out at the curb) in the U.S. was about 1,660 pounds. Let’s say you’re a die-hard simple-living activist, and you reduce this to zero. You recycle everything. You bring cloth bags shopping. You fix your toaster. Your toes poke out of old tennis shoes. You’re not done yet, though. Since municipal waste includes not just residential waste, but also waste from government offices and businesses, you march to those offices, waste reduction pamphlets in hand, and convince them to cut down on their waste enough to eliminate your share of it. Uh, I’ve got some bad news. Municipal waste accounts for only 3 percent of total waste production in the United States. I want to be clear. I’m not saying we shouldn’t live simply. I live reasonably simply myself, but I don’t pretend that not buying much (or not driving much, or not having kids) is a powerful political act, or that it’s deeply revolutionary. It’s not. Personal change doesn’t equal social change.

#### ---Individual local strategies fail to adapt to the inevitability of global concerns and guarantees a world dominated by violence and energy addiction

Monbiot 2004

George, journalist, academic, and political and environmental activist, Manifesto for a New World Order, p. 11-13

The quest for global solutions is difficult and divisive. **Some members of this movement are** deeply **suspicious of all institutional power** at the global level, fearing that it could never be held to account by the world’s people. Others are concerned that a single set of universal prescriptions would threaten the diversity of dissent. **A smaller faction has argued that all political programmes are oppressive**: our task should not be to replace one form of power with another, but to replace all power with a magical essence called ‘anti-power’. **But** most of the members of this movement are coming to recognize that **if we propose solutions which can be effected only at the local** or the national **level, we remove ourselves from any meaningful role in solving precisely those problems which most concern us. Issues such as** cli­mate change, international debt, nuclear proliferation, **war, peace and the** balance of trade **between nations can be addressed only globally or internationally. Without global measures and global institutions, it is impossible to see how we might distribute wealth from rich nations to poor ones, tax the mobile rich and their even more mobile money, control the shipment of toxic waste,** sustain the ban on landmines, prevent the use of nuclear weapons, **broker peace between nations or prevent powerful states from forcing weaker ones to trade on their terms. If we were to work only at the local level, we would leave these, the most critical of issues, for other people to tackle. Global governance will take place** whether we participate **in it** or not. Indeed, **it must take place if the issues which concern us are not to be resolved by the brute force of the powerful. That the international institutions have been designed** or captured **by the dictatorship of vested interests is not an argument against the existence of international institutions**, but a reason for overthrowing them and re­placing them with our own. It is an argument for a global political system which holds power to account. **In the absence of an effective global politics**, moreover, **local solutions will always be undermined by communities of interest which do not share our vision. We might**, for example, **manage to persuade the people of the street in which we live to give up their cars** in the hope of preventing climate change, **but unless** everyone**, in all communities, either shares our politics or is bound by the same rules, we simply open new road space into which the neighbouring communities can expand. We might declare our obiliza­hood nuclear-free, but unless we are simultaneously work­ing, at the international level, for the abandonment of nuclear weapons, we can do** nothing **to prevent ourselves and everyone else from being threatened by people who are not as nice as we are**. We would deprive ourselves, in other words, of the power of restraint. **By first rebuilding the global politics, we establish the political space in which our local alternatives can flourish. If**, by contrast, **we were to leave the governance of the necessary global institutions to others, then those institutions will pick off our local, even our national, solutions one by one. There is little point in devising an alternative economic policy for your nation, as** Luis Inacio ‘**Lula**’ da Silva, **now president of Brazil, once advocated, if the International Monetary Fund** and the financial speculators **have not first been overthrown**. **There is little point in fighting to protect a coral reef from** local **pollution, if nothing has been done to prevent climate change** from destroying the conditions it requires for its survival.

#### ---The alternative reifies constructed Western notions of the ‘local’ that collapses autonomy and masks oppression.

Escobar 1995

Arturo, Associate professor of Anthropology @ UMASS, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, pg. 170

As Ana Maria Alonso (1992) remarked in the context of another peasant struggle at another historical moment, one must be careful not to naturalize “traditional” worlds, that is, valorize as innocent and “natural” an order produced by history (such as the Andean world in PRATEC’s case or many of the grassroots alternative spoken about by activists in various countries). These orders can also be interpreted in terms of specific effects of power and meaning. The “local,” moreover, is neither unconnected nor unconstructed, as it is thought at times. The temptation to “consume” grassroots experiences in the market for “alternatives” in Western academe should also be avoided. As Rey Chow warns (1922), one must resist participating in the reification of Third World experiences that often takes place under such rubrics as multiculturalism and cultural diversity. This reification hides other mechanisms; The apparent receptiveness of our curricula to the Third World, as receptiveness that makes full use of non-Western human specimens as instruments for articulation, is something we have to practice and deconstruct at once…We [must] find a resistance to the liberal illusion of the autonomy and independence we can “give” the other. It shows that social knowledge (and the responsibility that this knowledge entails) is not simply a matter of empathy or identification with “the other” whose sorrows and frustrations are being made part of the spectacle…This means that *our* attempts to “explore the ‘other’ point of view” and “to give it a chance to speak for itself,” as the passion of many current discourse goes, must always be distinguished from the other’s struggles, no matter how enthusiastically we assume the nonexistence of that distinction. (111,112)

#### ---Economic decline does not cause war.

Miller 2000

Morris, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### And Biodiversity collapse also doesn’t cause extinction

Jablonski 1 (Prof @ Department of Geophysical Sciences, University of Chicago “Lessons from the past: Evolutionary impacts of mass extinctions” May 16. http://www.pnas.org/content/98/10/5393.full//Donnie)

Mass extinctions have never entirely reset the evolutionary clock: even the huge losses at the end of the Permian, which appear to have permanently restructured marine and terrestrial communities, left enough taxa and functional groups standing to seed the recovery process without the origin of new phyla ([39](file:///C%3A%5CUsers%5CDebate%2013%5CDownloads%5Cimpact%20defense-earth%20destruction-or-disease%20%281%29.doc#ref-39)). One key to understanding the past and future evolutionary role of extinctions will involve the factors that permit the persistence of certain biological trends or patterns—e.g., net expansion or contraction of clades or directional shifts in morphology—in the face of extensive taxonomic loss and ecological disruption. Besides extinction, at least four evolutionary patterns can be seen in the fossil record. These are: (i) unbroken continuity, (ii) continuity with setbacks, (iii) survival without recovery (“dead clade walking”), and (v) unbridled diversification.

#### Nationalist scapegoating precludes anti-capitalist mobilization --- CFIUS allows all the problems of capitalism to be blamed on China.

Moody 2000

Kim, staff writer for Labor Notes and author of An Injury to All and Workers in a Lean World, Protectionism or Solidarity? (Part I), http://www.solidarity-us.org/site/node/951

From a Marxist point of view, it seems obvious that the roots of economic nationalism have something to do with imperialism, and that globalization is at heart imperialism shorn of colonialism and dressed up as inevitability and the free market.[See note 6] Nationalism, of course, like reformist ideology in general, has many deep, often complex roots in U.S. history and culture, but like much in the daily consciousness of all classes in society it requires material nourishment over time. While it is primarily capital that has benefitted from imperialism, its fruits have, over time, worked their way through the U.S. economy to benefit a majority of the working class enough to cement national loyalty and underwrite reformist consciousness.[See note 7] It seems clear that for a quarter of a century or more following World War Two, the relative, though uneven, growth of working class living standards reinforced the belief that there was a close connection between living in the United States, being an American, and either experiencing more economic security than any working class in history or, at least, seeing the possibility of attaining that kind of material well-being. This perception was not simply the complacent consciousness of the white majority, much less of some small labor aristocracy. It was also in part what drove the social movements of the 1950s and 1960s, above all the African American civil rights and liberation movements. Even for the excluded, the incredible wealth of the nation and the well-being of so many within it, offered hope-the potential of giving the myth of the American Dream some reality if only the visible barriers of discrimination could be dismantled. Outside U.S. borders, however, only in a select few countries of Europe and the English-speaking settler nations could workers aspire to such living standards. For the majority of the world's toilers, the uneven world created by imperialism meant that the outer possibility was not the struggle up from poverty to prosperity, but only from misery to poverty, so long as the structures of imperialism (globalization) remained in place. By the 1970s, U.S. and then world capitalism experienced an accelerating crisis of profitability and the deepest worldwide recession since the 1930s, both of which increased simultaneously capital's movement abroad and its desire to tame labor at home. Yet it was almost a decade before capital's offensive against the U.S. working class took on momentum and the living standards associated with U.S. international "hegemony" began to deteriorate visibly. Within the unionized working class, the "Blue Collar Blues" and Black worker rebellions of the late 1960s and early 1970s were largely broken by the world recession of 1974-75-as well as by actions of the labor bureaucracy and the state. The old collective bargaining institutions, occasionally helped by strikes, however, continued to be able to recoup economic losses for those covered by them until the late 1970s. With the beginnings of real income decline and, at the same time, the first signs of an import "crisis" in the late 1970s, economic nationalism got a new lease on life, directing attention and activity toward "the border" and protectionism. The "problem" was easily seen as imports on the one hand, and, somewhat later, immigrants on the other: foreigners, here or there, "taking" American jobs. For years, as Dana Frank shows in detail, the unions put this message out to their members and the public in various "Buy American" campaigns. Since imports were real, this view had credibility, just as it does in the case of China or the steel industry today-even if it could be demonstrated that more jobs were lost to domestic downsizing, lean production methods, new technology, and other homespun means of increasing profits. There was more, however, for the impact of this crisis fell on an institutional setup that already encouraged economic nationalism. When the CIO abandoned the fight for a broad class political agenda on questions such as housing, education, health care, pensions, unemployment income and mass transportation in the late 1940s, it turned instead to constructing "private welfare states" through industry-by-industry or company-by-company benefits bargaining. This retreat both abandoned a broader class perspective and laid the basis for a new kind of economic nationalism unique in most respects to the United States. It was an economic nationalism (and narrow political consciousness) in which the nation, the employer, and the union became intimately intertwined. "What's good for General Motors is what's good for the nation," was GM chairman C.E. Wilson's capitalist view of the bonds of corporation and nation. For the worker, whose health care, retirement and children's future depended on company-provided, even if union-won, benefits (largely not available from the state in the U.S.), the union was a natural amendment to Wilson's self-serving equation of capital and nation. Even after the CEOs publicly broke the corporation-nation equation in favor of the new executive cosmopolitanism and investor globalism in the 1980s, the link between the nation, the company, the union, and the worker's economic well-being remained imbedded in the negotiated "private welfare state." Furthermore, the deterioration of the benefits of that setup could easily be blamed simultaneously on the new cosmopolitanism of the corporation and the external threat of imports. Hate the company for its betrayal of the economic nation, but defend it from the "outsider" in order to save your benefits. Appropriate the flag to fight management, as so many strikes have, but look to the defense of the business in the protection afforded by the border.

#### The removal of CFIUS anti-market forces solves bad capitalism and is historically distinct from the system described in their evidence.

De Landa 1998

Manuel, Markets and Antimarkets in the World Economy, http://www.alamut.com/subj/economics/de\_landa/antiMarkets.html

When approaching the subject of economic power, one can safely ignore the entire field of linear mathematical economics (so-called competitive equilibrium economics), since there monopolies and oligopolies are basically ignored. Yet, even those thinkers who make economic power the center of their models, introduce it in a way that ignores historical facts. Authors writing in the Marxist tradition, place real history in a straight-jacket by subordinating it to a model of a progressive succession of modes of production. Capitalism itself is seen as maturing through a series of stages, the latest one of which is the monopolistic stage in this century. Even non-Marxists economists like Galbraith, agree that capitalism began as a competitive pursuit and stayed that way till the end of the nineteenth century, and only then it reached the monopolistic stage, at which point a planning system replaced market dynamics. However, Fernand Braudel has recently shown, with a wealth of historical data, that this picture is inherently wrong. Capitalism was, from its beginnings in the Italy of the thirteenth century, always monopolistic and oligopolistic. That is to say, the power of capitalism has always been associated with large enterprises, large that is, relative to the size of the markets where they operate. [6] Also, it has always been associated with the ability to plan economic strategies and to control market dynamics, and therefore, with a certain degree of centralization and hierarchy. Within the limits of this presentation, I will not be able to review the historical evidence that supports this extremely important hypothesis, but allow me at least to extract some of the consequences that would follow if it turns out to be true. First of all, if capitalism has always relied on non-competitive practices, if the prices for its commodities have never been objectively set by demand/supply dynamics, but imposed from above by powerful economic decision-makers, then capitalism and the market have always been different entities. To use a term introduced by Braudel, capitalism has always been an "antimarket". This, of course, would seem to go against the very meaning of the word "capitalism", regardless of whether the word is used by Karl Marx or Ronald Reagan. For both nineteenth century radicals and twentieth century conservatives, capitalism is identified with an economy driven by market forces, whether one finds this desirable or not. Today, for example, one speaks of the former Soviet Union's "transition to a market economy", even though what was really supposed to happen was a transition to an antimarket: to large scale enterprises, with several layers of managerial strata, in which prices are set not taken. This conceptual confusion is so entrenched that I believe the only solution is to abandon the term "capitalism" completely, and to begin speaking of markets and antimarkets and their dynamics.

####  (A.) Withdrawing from global trade locks the alternative within a nationalist frame precluding transnational solidarity and organization.

Bello & Mittal 2000

Walden, Anuradha, Dangerous Liaisons: Progressives, the Right, and the Anti-China Trade Campaign, Institute for Food and Development Policy/Food First, May, http://www.tni.org/archives/archives\_bello\_china

The anti-China trade campaign amounts to a Faustian bargain that seeks to buy some space for US organized labor at the expense of real solidarity with workers and progressive worker and environmental movements globally against transnational capital. But by buying into the traditional US imperial response of unilateralism, it will end up eventually eroding the position of progressive labor, environmental, and civil society movements both in the US and throughout the world. What organized labor and US NGO's should be doing, instead, is articulating a positive agenda aimed at weakening the power of global corporations and multilateral agencies that promote TNC-led globalization.

#### (B.) Total rejection of capitalism fragments resistance and reifies structural oppression.

Gibson-Graham 1996

J.K., feminist economist, End of Capitalism, pg 263-264

One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce a knowledge of capitalism. Yet as “that which is known,” Capitalism has become the intimate enemy. We have uncloaked the ideologically-clothed, obscure monster, but we have installed a naked and visible monster in its place. In return for our labors of creation, the monster has robbed us of all force. We hear – and find it easy to believe – that the left is in disarray. Part of what produces the disarray of the left is the vision of what the left is arrayed against. When capitalism is represented as a unified system coextensive with the nation or even the world, when it is portrayed as crowding out all other economic forms, when it is allowed to define entire societies, it becomes something that can only be defeated and replaced by a mass collective movement (or by a process of systemic dissolution that such a movement might assist). The revolutionary task of replacing capitalism now seems outmoded and unrealistic, yet we do not seem to have an alternative conception of class transformation to take its place. The old political economic “systems” and “structures” that call forth a vision of revolution as systemic replacement still seem to be dominant in the Marxist political imagination. The New World Order is often represented as political fragmentation founded upon economic unification. In this vision the economy appears as the last stronghold of unity and singularity in a world of diversity and plurality. But why can’t the economy be fragmented too? If we theorized it as fragmented in the United States, we could being to see a huge state sector (incorporating a variety of forms of appropriation of surplus labor), a very large sector of self-employed and family-based producers (most noncapitalist), a huge household sector (again, quite various in terms of forms of exploitation, with some households moving towards communal or collective appropriation and others operating in a traditional mode in which one adult appropriates surplus labor from another). None of these things is easy to see. If capitalism takes up the available social space, there’s no room for anything else. If capitalism cannot coexist, there’s no possibility of anything else. If capitalism functions as a unity, it cannot be partially or locally replaced. My intent is to help create the discursive conception under which socialist or other noncapitalist construction becomes “realistic” present activity rather than a ludicrous or utopian goal. To achieve this I must smash Capitalism and see it in a thousand pieces. I must make its unity a fantasy, visible as a denial of diversity and change.

#### ---Capitalism will not collapse & rejection surrenders to the right --- The only solution is transforming the structures of trade from within.

Zizek 2007

Slavoj, Resistance is Surrender, London Review of Books, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n22/slavoj-zizek/resistance-is-surrender

One of the clearest lessons of the last few decades is that capitalism is indestructible. Marx compared it to a vampire, and one of the salient points of comparison now appears to be that vampires always rise up again after being stabbed to death. Even Mao’s attempt, in the Cultural Revolution, to wipe out the traces of capitalism, ended up in its triumphant return. Today’s Left reacts in a wide variety of ways to the hegemony of global capitalism and its political supplement, liberal democracy. It might, for example, accept the hegemony, but continue to fight for reform within its rules (this is Third Way social democracy). Or, it accepts that the hegemony is here to stay, but should nonetheless be resisted from its ‘interstices’. Or, it accepts the futility of all struggle, since the hegemony is so all-encompassing that nothing can really be done except wait for an outburst of ‘divine violence’ – a revolutionary version of Heidegger’s ‘only God can save us.’ Or, it recognises the temporary futility of the struggle. In today’s triumph of global capitalism, the argument goes, true resistance is not possible, so all we can do till the revolutionary spirit of the global working class is renewed is defend what remains of the welfare state, confronting those in power with demands we know they cannot fulfil, and otherwise withdraw into cultural studies, where one can quietly pursue the work of criticism. Or, it emphasises the fact that the problem is a more fundamental one, that global capitalism is ultimately an effect of the underlying principles of technology or ‘instrumental reason’. Or, it posits that one can undermine global capitalism and state power, not by directly attacking them, but by refocusing the field of struggle on everyday practices, where one can ‘build a new world’; in this way, the foundations of the power of capital and the state will be gradually undermined, and, at some point, the state will collapse (the exemplar of this approach is the Zapatista movement). Or, it takes the ‘postmodern’ route, shifting the accent from anti-capitalist struggle to the multiple forms of politico-ideological struggle for hegemony, emphasising the importance of discursive re-articulation. Or, it wagers that one can repeat at the postmodern level the classical Marxist gesture of enacting the ‘determinate negation’ of capitalism: with today’s rise of ‘cognitive work’, the contradiction between social production and capitalist relations has become starker than ever, rendering possible for the first time ‘absolute democracy’ (this would be Hardt and Negri’s position). These positions are not presented as a way of avoiding some ‘true’ radical Left politics – what they are trying to get around is, indeed, the lack of such a position. This defeat of the Left is not the whole story of the last thirty years, however. There is another, no less surprising, lesson to be learned from the Chinese Communists’ presiding over arguably the most explosive development of capitalism in history, and from the growth of West European Third Way social democracy. It is, in short: we can do it better. In the UK, the Thatcher revolution was, at the time, chaotic and impulsive, marked by unpredictable contingencies. It was Tony Blair who was able to institutionalise it, or, in Hegel’s terms, to raise (what first appeared as) a contingency, a historical accident, into a necessity. Thatcher wasn’t a Thatcherite, she was merely herself; it was Blair (more than Major) who truly gave form to Thatcherism. The response of some critics on the postmodern Left to this predicament is to call for a new politics of resistance. Those who still insist on fighting state power, let alone seizing it, are accused of remaining stuck within the ‘old paradigm’: the task today, their critics say, is to resist state power by withdrawing from its terrain and creating new spaces outside its control. This is, of course, the obverse of accepting the triumph of capitalism. The politics of resistance is nothing but the moralising supplement to a Third Way Left. Simon Critchley’s recent book, Infinitely Demanding, is an almost perfect embodiment of this position.[\*] For Critchley, the liberal-democratic state is here to stay. Attempts to abolish the state failed miserably; consequently, the new politics has to be located at a distance from it: anti-war movements, ecological organisations, groups protesting against racist or sexist abuses, and other forms of local self-organisation. It must be a politics of resistance to the state, of bombarding the state with impossible demands, of denouncing the limitations of state mechanisms. The main argument for conducting the politics of resistance at a distance from the state hinges on the ethical dimension of the ‘infinitely demanding’ call for justice: no state can heed this call, since its ultimate goal is the ‘real-political’ one of ensuring its own reproduction (its economic growth, public safety, etc). ‘Of course,’ Critchley writes, history is habitually written by the people with the guns and sticks and one cannot expect to defeat them with mocking satire and feather dusters. Yet, as the history of ultra-leftist active nihilism eloquently shows, one is lost the moment one picks up the guns and sticks. Anarchic political resistance should not seek to mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty it opposes. So what should, say, the US Democrats do? Stop competing for state power and withdraw to the interstices of the state, leaving state power to the Republicans and start a campaign of anarchic resistance to it? And what would Critchley do if he were facing an adversary like Hitler? Surely in such a case one should ‘mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty’ one opposes? Shouldn’t the Left draw a distinction between the circumstances in which one would resort to violence in confronting the state, and those in which all one can and should do is use ‘mocking satire and feather dusters’? The ambiguity of Critchley’s position resides in a strange non sequitur: if the state is here to stay, if it is impossible to abolish it (or capitalism), why retreat from it? Why not act with(in) the state? Why not accept the basic premise of the Third Way? Why limit oneself to a politics which, as Critchley puts it, ‘calls the state into question and calls the established order to account, not in order to do away with the state, desirable though that might well be in some utopian sense, but in order to better it or attenuate its malicious effect’?

#### ---Turn --- Interdependence through foreign investment solves all of their turns – it creates an ethic of mutual recognition and respect between competittors that doesn’t require instrumentalization of all life

Badhwar 2007

Neera K., Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Oklahoma - September “Friendship and Commercial Societies” Forthcoming in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics <http://praxeology.net/guest-badhwar1.htm>

I have argued that the critics of market societies misunderstand both markets and friendship by conceiving of them in radically dichotomous terms. Instrumentality, fungibility, impersonality etc. come in varying degrees and characterize not only market, but also non-market, relationships, including friendship. Further, although market relations are primarily instrumental, they are not entirely so, because the individuals involved are not mere means to ends. It is this recognition that ultimately justifies the prohibition of force and fraud that is essential to a market relationship, and free markets are the most potent social force for promoting this recognition. Moreover, like all productive or creative activities, market activities play an important role in a meaningful life and, thus, are essentially structured by moral norms. For all these reasons, far from militating against friendship, market relations often give rise to friendship, and market societies are friendlier to civic and character friendship than any other developed form of society.

#### ---Value to life and all of their impacts are affirmative arguments --- The expression of economic human potential breaks free from the normative constraints of subjectivity in favor of new forms of emotional intensity.

Badhwar 2007

Neera K., Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oklahoma, Friendship and Commercial Societies, Forthcoming in *Politics, Philosophy, and Economics*, http://praxeology.net/guest-badhwar1.htm

None of this is to deny that when the means to an end is not a human being or a human relationship, and the end in question is morally permissible, the end is unqualifiedly more important than the means, since the value of the means derives from the value of the end. Hence, if economic production were only a means to the ends of survival, comfort, pleasure, personal relationships etc., then it could fairly be said to be lower on the scale of value than these ends. But **there is no reason to think that production is only a means to these ends** (although its role as a means is hardly negligible in the absence of a regular delivery of manna from heaven). **To relegate it to a lower realm of human existence**, as Schwarzenbach and other critics do, **is to show a serious misunderstanding of** its role in a good **human life.** People engage in economic production for many of the same sorts of reasons that they engage in intellectual or artistic production – proving theorems, writing treatises, making music - or, indeed, building friendships: for the sake of exercising their creative or productive powers in worthwhile enterprises. Although Fromm fails to appreciate this about economic production, he appreciates better than even some defenders of free markets the meaning and importance of productiveness as such. “Productiveness,” he states, “is man’s ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him” (1949: 84), and again, “[p]roductiveness means that he experiences himself as the embodiment of his powers and as the `actor’; that he feels himself one with his powers and at the same time that they are not masked and alienated from him” (86). When productiveness is understood as a positive expression of human potentiality and not simply as a means to the ends of survival, comfort, or wealth, we can appreciate the entrepreneurial and creative spirit that animates all worthwhile activities, including market activities. And then we can understand why, for instance, a philosophy Ph.D. would find satisfaction in the enterprise of producing skateboards “adorned with uplifting art.”[34] Worthwhile activity in any sphere exercises our imaginative, emotional, and intellectual powers to create things of worth and, thereby, engages and re-shapes our identity. This is at least one reason why the failure of a business enterprise can be as devastating as the failure of a long-term scientific enterprise - or of a long-term friendship. Seeing commercial activities as “poiesis” and friendship as “praxis” distorts the nature of both business enterprises and friendships.

#### ---The alternative fails --- Markets are inevitable and culturally universal.

Lavoie and Chamlee-Wright 2000

Don Lavoie Professor of Economics at George Mason University and Emily Chamlee-Wright Associate Professor of Economics and Management at Beloit College, Culture and Enterprise: the development, representation, and morality of business p. 47-48

Indeed the favorite stick with which the left likes to hit economists is the claim that their faith in markets is a bias of our own Western capitalist culture, a sign of unreflective Eurocentrism and logocentrism. Only because we are modernists, children of the European Enlightenment, only because we are so fixated on reason, and efficiency and so forth, do we find markets so beautiful. Markets are understood primarily to be a playground for the wealthy and powerful, not an arena where women or the poor, or for that matter most of the population of non-Western countries, can partake in its advantages. We should not impose our Western sorts of institutions on those who cannot, or perhaps would not want to, occupy that playground. Since economists have been so intent on defending the grand universality of their theories, they have failed to respond to the left in their own terms. Markets in fact are ubiquitous. They emerge in nearly all the cultures we know of. Is it not the left's distrust of markets, deriving from the legacy of Karl Marx, that harbors a peculiarly Western bias? Consulting the historical record of vastly divergent cultures suggests that the economic argument in favor of the universality of markets is more persuasive (see, for example, Anderson and Latham 1986; Baechler 1975; Berger 1986; Boettke 1994; Hayek 1954; Rosenberg and Bird2ell 1986). The Chinese historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien ([c. 145—86 BC] 1961: 477) had already observed the coordinating capacity of the market process over two thousand years ago. There must be farmers to produce food, men to extract the wealth of mountains and marshes, artisans to process these things and merchants to circulate them. There is no need to wait for government orders: each man will play his part, doing his best to get what he desires. So cheap goods will go where they fetch more, while expensive goods will make men search for cheap ones. When all work willingly at their trades, just as water flows ceaselessly downhill day and night, things will appear unsought and people will produce them without being asked. For clearly this accords with the Way and is in keeping with nature. Centuries before Westerners ever set foot on the African continent, intricate long-distance trade networks had developed which connected East to West and North to South as early as 1100 AD. The establishment of local marketplaces, which were the site of cultural as well as economic exchange among neighboring African villages and tribes predates recorded history (see Ayittey 1991). Commerce and trade holds a similar place in Latin American history. By the first century BC, the Mexican city of Teotihuacan was already foreshadowing its eventual blossoming into a vital commercial center. By the fifth century AD, Teotihuacan regularly received merchants from as far away as the Yucatan and Guatemala (Kandell 1988). Western imperialism certainly cannot account for these early examples of market society. Nor can Western imperialism account for all the contemporary cases of complex market activity. What colonial experience introduced in many third-world countries was cash crop production, in particular through the introduction of colonial taxes payable only in Western currencies (see Moon 1926: 75—96), not markets. The complex domestic markets of Africa, Latin America, and Asia have well established roots in the history and culture of their respective indigenous societies. It appears, then, that **no matter what the culture or age**, human society has a **strong propensity** to generate and engage in market activity.

#### ---Rationalist security reviews of oil and natural gas investment causes militarism, violence against millions and makes effective policy-making impossible.

Hillyard et. al. 12

Hildyard Lohmann & Sexton 2012-Nicholas, founder and Director of The Corner House, Larry, author of the book “Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power” & works at the British NGO The Corner House, Sarah, a director of The Corner House, Energy Security For What? For Whom? The Corner House, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/energy-security-whom-what

Mainstream policy responses to such issues are largely framed in terms of “energy security”. The focus is on “securing” new and continued supplies of oil, coal and gas, building nuclear plants and even translating renewables into a massive export system; energy efficiency is accorded a lower priority, but transition away from fossil fuels is nowhere to be seen at all. Climate change objectives, though once at the forefront of policy responses, are increasingly relegated as concerns about “keeping the lights on” predominate. Yet, instead of making energy supplies more secure, such policies are triggering a cascade of new insecurities for millions of people – whether as a result of the everyday violence that frequently accompanies the development of frontier oil and gas reserves, or because the pursuit of “energy security” through market-based policies denies many people access to the energy produced. Indeed, the more that the term “energy security” is invoked, the less clear it is just what is being “secured”. Like many other political buzzwords, “energy security” has become a plastic phrase used by a range of different interest groups to signify many often contradictory goals. For many individuals, energy security may simply mean being able to afford heating in the depths of a cold winter or having access to a means of cooking – a “logic of subsistence”. For political parties in government, it may mean ensuring that a nation’s most important corporations have reliable contracts with guaranteed fuel suppliers until the next election. For exporting countries, it may mean making certain that their customers maintain their demand for their oil or gas via long-term contracts. The multiple meanings of “energy security” have become an obstacle to clear thinking and good policymaking. They are also an open invitation for deception and demagoguery, making it easy for politicians and their advisers to use fear to push regressive, militaristic social and environmental programmes: “Energy security is a concept notorious for its vague and slippery nature, no less so because it is bound to mean different things at different times to different actors within the international energy system.” This multi-faceted nature makes it difficult, if not impossible, to come up with a definition that is accepted by all, which is hardly surprising given that no single term can capture realities on the ground involving different histories and materialities.

#### ---Addressing the conditions of militarism outweighs specific scenarios for war --- Creates the conditions of constant violence eliminating the difference between peace and war; makes their scenario inevitable.

Dabashi 2007

Hamid, Thinking beyond the US invasion of Iran, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/831/focus.htm

More than being at war, what works best for the US/Israeli warlords is being in "a state of war" -- for the fear of war is the best condition in which they want to keep the world. Come March, April, May or whenever, US/Israel may or may not, invade Iran. If the war indeed happens, no one will count the Iranian dead, for counting them will amount to no moral outrage loud enough to match what is happening to the world. CNN will count the US soldiers' casualties, but even this, too, will dissipate into a vacuous pomposity that could not care less about the poor and disenfranchised Americans who are grabbed by the throat of their poverty, and catapulted half way around the globe to maim, murder, torture, and rape their own brothers and sisters. For every one US casualty (which is one too many) there will be anywhere between one to two hundred Iranian casualties, if we were to take the Iraqi case as our measure. No one will hold anyone responsible. The Iranian neo-con contingency will have made their career and lucrative contracts, and still appear on television. Just like Fouad Ajami, they will tell Americans that these Iranians, just like Iraqis, did not deserve the gift of freedom and democracy that the Americans were offering them (as he proposes in his new book The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq ). The rest of the world will have gotten even more used to the state of war that US/Israel is imposing on the globe. The invasion of Iran will add yet another front to the US/Israeli global flexing of its military prowess. And if they -- the US government and Jewish state (the two most violent states on planet Earth) -- don't invade Iran, it still makes no difference. All it takes is a comment here by President Bush, or a suggestion there by Vice President Cheney, or yet another confession that Israel makes that it indeed has massive nuclear capacities -- or else planting of a news story that Israel may attack Iran. The actual context of these news, that the US/Israel may or may not attack Iran, is entirely irrelevant to the reality of positing these threats. It is this that keeps the world on the edge of its seat, making fear and warmongering the paramount condition of our lives. In his groundbreaking work on the "state of exception", the distinguished Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has begun the uncanny task of theorising what has hitherto been delegated to the realm of necessities legem non habet ("necessity has no law"). Defying this dictum, Agamben has taken Karl Schmitt's famous pronouncement in his Political Theology (that the sovereign is "he who decides on the state of exception") quite seriously and sought to theorise that state of exception. In Agamben's own project, what he calls the "no- man's land between public law and political fact, and between the juridical order and life" remains paramount. But adjacent to that effectively juridical project, there remains a widespread culture of catastrophe that must systematically generate and sustain that state of exception, which here and now in the United States, and the world it ruthlessly rules, amounts to a perpetual state of war. It is to that state, and not merely its potential and actual evidence, that we must learn how to respond.

## \*\*\*1AR

### \*\*\*T – Restrictions

#### Restrictions on foreign investment are access restrictions on production of oil

Exxon Mobile no date (“Risk factors,” http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/safety\_climate\_mgmt\_risk.aspx)

Access limitations. A number of countries limit access to their oil and gas resources, or may place resources off-limits from development altogether. Restrictions on foreign investment in the oil and gas sector tend to increase in times of high commodity prices, when national governments may have less need of outside sources of private capital. Many countries also restrict the import or export of certain products based on point of origin.

#### 5. The plan is directly tied to oil and gas production-Capital is intrinsically tied to future increases

Houston Chronicle 1/4/12 International players jump at U.S. shale Simone Sebastian

<http://www.chron.com/business/article/International-players-jump-at-U-S-shale-2439490.php>

Energy companies are funneling billions of dollars into the booming business of U.S. shale drilling. They are investing euros, yuan and krone, too. Chinese corporation Sinopec and French company Total this week became the latest in a string of foreign firms to announce big bets on the resurgence of U.S. fossil fuel production. International energy companies are signing billion-dollar deals with U.S. firms to reap the financial benefits of their oil fields and siphon knowledge from their experience in extracting petroleum from dense shale rock to carry the skills overseas. In return, they are ponying up the funds to get more wells drilled, so the oil and natural gas bounty trapped deep below can get to market quickly. "The big motivation for (U.S.companies) wanting to find a partner is finding someone with big pockets," said Scott Hanold, energy research analyst for RBC Capital Markets. "They are just money men at the end of the day." Total signed its second shale compact with Oklahoma-based natural gas producer Chesapeake Energy last week to secure acreage in Ohio's burgeoning Utica shale. The French energy giant got 25 percent interest in a 619,000-acre joint venture with Chesapeake and Houston-based EnerVest. In exchange, it forked over $700 million cash along with a promise to fund 60 percent, or about $1.63 billion, of the group's drilling and well completion costs in the Utica. The companies plan to have 25 rigs operating by 2014. China's Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration & Production Corp. muscled its way into U.S. shale with a $2.2 billion investment in oil fields owned by Oklahoma-based energy company Devon, announced Tuesday. The Chinese corporation gains one-third interest in Devon's 1.2 million acres in the Utica shale, the Michigan Basin, the Mississippian in Oklahoma, the Tuscaloosa marine shale in Louisiana and the Niobrara in Wyoming. Sinopec will pay $900 million cash when the deal closes, expected in 2012's first quarter, and cover 70 percent of Devon's drilling costs, about $1.6 billion.

### \*\*\*Case

### A2: China Oil Weapon

#### commercial interests- they wont divert oil and gas from the US back to China.

McCarthy and Jordan 8-4-12 (Shawn and Pav, China goes corporate with bid for Canadian oil, http://m.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/china-goes-corporate-with-bid-for-canadian-oil/article4446114/?service=mobile)

So far the CNOOC bid has not set off a political firestorm in Canada. Oil patch sources say the industry mood is nervously supportive of the deal, but officials would look less kindly on a foreign buying spree aimed at major domestic companies such as Suncor or Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. That reaction is a reflection of the increasingly sophisticated and politically astute approach Chinese officials have taken in recent years, after some glaring missteps in previous takeover attempts. CNOOC has carefully built an operating partnership with Nexen, won the support of the company’s board with a fat premium on the offer price, and made key commitments that specifically address Ottawa’s “net benefit” requirement for approving foreign takeovers. Chinese SOEs have been pursuing global resource developments for more than a decade, at first in Africa, and then in South America, Australia and Canada, but have usually invested in undeveloped properties or minority positions as non-operating partners. In reviewing the CNOOC deal, Ottawa will look for commitments that the company will operate in Canada in a strictly commercial fashion. But critics suggest the Harper government has failed to erect a clear screening mechanism that would inform both Canadians and offshore investors what level of foreign acquisitions would be acceptable, and under what circumstances. And they point out the government has neglected to demand reciprocity, with the same right for Canadian companies to acquire Chinese assets as CNOOC and other SOEs have here. CNOOC chief executive officer Li Fanrong said he’s puzzled that there should be any doubt that his company’s acquisition of Nexen will benefit Canada by bringing much greater financial heft to its oil sands properties, while locating CNOOC’s headquarters for North and Central America in Calgary. And he vehemently rejects the view that CNOOC, like other Chinese state-owned enterprises, are agents of the Communist government in Beijing. “Every decision we make is based on whether we can provide value to our shareholders,” Mr. Li said in an interview after the deal was announced Monday. “We are purely a commercial entity.” GROWING INDEPENDENCE CNOOC is a publicly traded subsidiary of Chinese National Offshore Oil Corp., which is wholly owned by Beijing. The parent company owns 64 per cent of the international subsidiary, whose shareholders include heavyweights like the Blackstone Group LP. (The New York-based fund has recently received $500-million (U.S.) in capital from China’s foreign bank, which holds massive currency reserves.) Mr. Li’s assertion of independence is backed by a number of western analysts, including the International Energy Agency, the Paris-based advisory body to developed countries. In a report last year, the IEA concluded the three leading Chinese state oil companies – CNOOC, PetroChina and Sinopec – have gained considerable independence from the government department to which their parent companies formally report, and that their investments have been driven by commercial interests. A series of papers released this year by the Canadian Council of Chief Executives and Canadian International Council reached similar conclusions. The leading oil companies are “profit-driven to their core,” and are urged by their own government to “compete, compete, compete,” wrote Margaret Cornish, a former executive director of the Canada-China Business Council and now chief representative of the Calgary-based law firm Bennett Jones LLBs in its Beijing consulting office. Ms. Cornish said major Chinese firms market their oil wherever they can get the best price, rather than – as many critics fear – simply sending the crude to their home markets. And she said they rely on financial markets and their own balance sheets to fund acquisitions and operations. In another paper, Georgetown University professor Theodore Moran assessed the security risks from Chinese state-owned investment, and concluded there is little concern when SOEs go after publicly traded resources companies that have little market power and no access to sensitive government information. (As it was negotiating with CNOOC over a possible deal, Nexen met in April with Richard Fadden, director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Neither side will discuss details of that meeting.) In an interview, Prof. Moran said Chinese state ownership is not without its risks, adding that, through such firms, Beijing has been attempting to get control of the world market in rare earth metals that are critical for high-tech manufacturing. However, he said Chinese investment in the oil and gas business is generally regarded as a positive, even by the American government which is keen to see additional supply brought on to the global market.

#### Ability- They control less than 2% of the market

Rosen and Houser 07 (Daniel, Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics, and Trevor-Visiting Fellow, Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies, China Energy: A Guide for the Perplexed, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/rosen0507.pdf)

As stated in the previous section, concerns about the overseas activities of China’s energy firms fall into three categories: Such firms harm the energy security of others by taking oil off markets; they harm the economic interests of IOCs by competing unfairly; and they hurt strategic interests by disrupting existing political and economic dynamics. The first contention we reject out of hand. Despite all the rhetoric about Chinese oil companies locking up resources through equity agreements, total international production by Chinese firms accounts for less than 2 percent of the global oil trade. 96 It will be nearly impossible for these companies to satisfy China’s import needs, let alone gain a big enough position in the market to threaten US oil security. As China is now the world’s second-largest oil consumer, we should expect the profile of Chinese oil companies on the international stage to increase. And we should welcome and encourage the emergence of Chinese firms that abide by international norms for competition and investment.

### \*\*\*K

### Alternative fails

#### Alt Fails

Zizek 2007

Slavoj, Resistance is Surrender: What to Do about Capitalism?, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n22/slavoj-zizek/resistance-is-surrender

These positions are not presented as a way of avoiding some ‘true’ radical Left politics – what they are trying to get around is, indeed, the lack of such a position. This defeat of the Left is not the whole story of the last thirty years, however. There is another, no less surprising, lesson to be learned from the Chinese Communists’ presiding over arguably the most explosive development of capitalism in history, and from the growth of West European Third Way social democracy. It is, in short: we can do it better. In the UK, the Thatcher revolution was, at the time, chaotic and impulsive, marked by unpredictable contingencies. It was Tony Blair who was able to institutionalise it, or, in Hegel’s terms, to raise (what first appeared as) a contingency, a historical accident, into a necessity. Thatcher wasn’t a Thatcherite, she was merely herself; it was Blair (more than Major) who truly gave form to Thatcherism. The response of some critics on the postmodern Left to this predicament is to call for a new politics of resistance. Those who still insist on fighting state power, let alone seizing it, are accused of remaining stuck within the ‘old paradigm’: the task today, their critics say, is to resist state power by withdrawing from its terrain and creating new spaces outside its control. This is, of course, the obverse of accepting the triumph of capitalism. The politics of resistance is nothing but the moralising supplement to a Third Way Left. Simon Critchley’s recent book, Infinitely Demanding, is an almost perfect embodiment of this position.[\*] For Critchley, the liberal-democratic state is here to stay. Attempts to abolish the state failed miserably; consequently, the new politics has to be located at a distance from it: anti-war movements, ecological organisations, groups protesting against racist or sexist abuses, and other forms of local self-organisation. It must be a politics of resistance to the state, of bombarding the state with impossible demands, of denouncing the limitations of state mechanisms. The main argument for conducting the politics of resistance at a distance from the state hinges on the ethical dimension of the ‘infinitely demanding’ call for justice: no state can heed this call, since its ultimate goal is the ‘real-political’ one of ensuring its own reproduction (its economic growth, public safety, etc). ‘Of course,’ Critchley writes, history is habitually written by the people with the guns and sticks and one cannot expect to defeat them with mocking satire and feather dusters. Yet, as the history of ultra-leftist active nihilism eloquently shows, one is lost the moment one picks up the guns and sticks. Anarchic political resistance should not seek to mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty it opposes. So what should, say, the US Democrats do? Stop competing for state power and withdraw to the interstices of the state, leaving state power to the Republicans and start a campaign of anarchic resistance to it? And what would Critchley do if he were facing an adversary like Hitler? Surely in such a case one should ‘mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty’ one opposes? Shouldn’t the Left draw a distinction between the circumstances in which one would resort to violence in confronting the state, and those in which all one can and should do is use ‘mocking satire and feather dusters’? The ambiguity of Critchley’s position resides in a strange non sequitur: if the state is here to stay, if it is impossible to abolish it (or capitalism), why retreat from it? Why not act with(in) the state? Why not accept the basic premise of the Third Way? Why limit oneself to a politics which, as Critchley puts it, ‘calls the state into question and calls the established order to account, not in order to do away with the state, desirable though that might well be in some utopian sense, but in order to better it or attenuate its malicious effect’? These words simply demonstrate that today’s liberal-democratic state and the dream of an ‘infinitely demanding’ anarchic politics exist in a relationship of mutual parasitism: anarchic agents do the ethical thinking, and the state does the work of running and regulating society. Critchley’s anarchic ethico-political agent acts like a superego, comfortably bombarding the state with demands; and the more the state tries to satisfy these demands, the more guilty it is seen to be. In compliance with this logic, the anarchic agents focus their protest not on open dictatorships, but on the hypocrisy of liberal democracies, who are accused of betraying their own professed principles. The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush’s reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!’ It is striking that the course on which Hugo Chávez has embarked since 2006 is the exact opposite of the one chosen by the postmodern Left: far from resisting state power, he grabbed it (first by an attempted coup, then democratically), ruthlessly using the Venezuelan state apparatuses to promote his goals. Furthermore, he is militarising the barrios, and organising the training of armed units there. And, the ultimate scare: now that he is feeling the economic effects of capital’s ‘resistance’ to his rule (temporary shortages of some goods in the state-subsidised supermarkets), he has announced plans to consolidate the 24 parties that support him into a single party. Even some of his allies are sceptical about this move: will it come at the expense of the popular movements that have given the Venezuelan revolution its élan? However, this choice, though risky, should be fully endorsed: the task is to make the new party function not as a typical state socialist (or Peronist) party, but as a vehicle for the mobilisation of new forms of politics (like the grass roots slum committees). What should we say to someone like Chávez? ‘No, do not grab state power, just withdraw, leave the state and the current situation in place’? Chávez is often dismissed as a clown – but wouldn’t such a withdrawal just reduce him to a version of Subcomandante Marcos, whom many Mexican leftists now refer to as ‘Subcomediante Marcos’? Today, it is the great capitalists – Bill Gates, corporate polluters, fox hunters – who ‘resist’ the state.